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case the original spelling has been preserved.

627

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

628

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:2

ABSTRACT
China was in the wrong in failing to protect non-combatant, private subjects of even the nations upon whom she was declaring
war. For such a crime there would come most drastic retribution.
So far as the [I]mperial Government is concerned, she either
forced such persons to become belligerent in self-defence, or violated all feelings of humanity by encompassing their death, and
that, too, by barbaric methods. To be shot down, as dies the soldier on the battle-field, may be passed calmly by; but one's blood
boils to think of delicate women, little children, and strong men,
beheaded, outraged, cut to pieces, their bodies cast to dogs and
wolves. The American missionaries, burned or slaughtered at
Pao-ting-fu, had never given the slightest offence, and were from
homes of Christian culture and refinement.
- Gilbert Reid, The Ethics of the Last China War, 32 THE FORUM
446, 454 (1901)
Literature concerned with the history of international criminal
law omits a major advancement in the field; the fin de siècle trial of
four Chinese officials in an international theatre for their participation in the massacre by Boxers of Chinese and Western Christians
in the city of Paoting-Fu. Before the matter was resolved the murders exacerbated tensions between the Allies and the Qing government, and would be acknowledged by the Great Powers as
“crimes against the laws of humanity.” The trial and execution of
the guilty officials excited international attention, and forced a diplomatic and public conversation on the limits and appropriateness
of international criminal punishment and retaliatory sentiment.
The case offers a cogent illustration of the dilemma confronting
the more conscientious elements of the Allied command; how to
honor the spirit of the new Hague Conventions, which were unprecedented in the degree to which they humanized war, while
preserving national honor. Ultimately, General Gaselee, commander of the Paoting-Fu expedition, managed to craft a judicial
forum for the trial which, while imperfect by modern standards, fit
squarely in the interstices between the old world of empire and the
emerging world of universal international law.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The birth of international criminal law is typically traced to
the post-war prosecutions of Nazi and Japanese war criminals by
the Allies,1 when in fact the Great Powers frequently turned to internationalized criminal or quasi-criminal forums, as well as the
rhetoric of ‘humanity’ and ‘civilization,’ to project power, establish
narratives, manage public opinion, express dissatisfaction, and defend humanitarian values in the century after the Napoleonic
wars.2 That these stories have been relegated to a narrative hinterland belies the important role each played in establishing an international criminal law vocabulary and shaping subsequent expectations of accountability.3 The purpose of this paper is to restore one
such significant but unexplored caesure—the trial of a number of
Chinese officials, accused of participating in Boxer atrocities, before
an ‘International Commission’ by the Great Powers in 1900.
The Boxer Uprising was an anti-Western and anti-Christian
peasant insurgency mostly located in Northeast China. A series of
Boxer attacks on Western missionaries, Christian Chinese converts,
and foreign legations and diplomats in Peking in early 1900
prompted the Great Powers (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and neophyte Japan) with interests in China to dispatch an international relief force in the
summer of that year. During the early stages of the intervention it
was reported that seventy Christians had been gruesomely murdered in Paoting-Fu;4 securing and punishing that city thereafter
became a priority for the Allies, who organized a punitive expedition after securing footholds in the nearby cities of Tientsin and
Peking.
The operation could have taken the form of other Allied expeditions, which were characterized by acts of extreme violence to1 See, e.g. A. CASSESE & P. GAETA, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 247
(2013) (explaining the origins of international criminal law).
2 See, e.g., infra notes 83, 158, 159.
3 See Jenny S. Martinez, Human Rights and History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 221, 237
(2013) (discussing how past ideas provide a vocabulary that shape the ways in
which we think about problems).
4 Department of State, No. 376 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 2, Bishop
Favier to Mr. Pichon, French Minister, in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITTED
TO CONGRESS, 180 (1900) (reporting that more than seventy Christians have been
massacred in Paoting-Fu) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901].
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ward Boxers (or unlucky civilians who came from villages suspected of harbouring Boxers). But the Paoting-Fu expedition was different. When the Allies reached the city in mid-October 1900, they
established an “International Commission” to inquire into the
cause of the massacres and apportion responsibility among guilty
parties who fell into their hands. In what was widely hailed as
“one of the most satisfactory aspects of the campaign,”5 the French,
German, Italian and British commissioners gathered evidence for
seven days and ultimately recommended death by beheading for
three Chinese officials, removal from office for another, and an additional trial in Tientsin for a fifth. The punishment was approved
by the Allied Field Marshal, the German General Alfred von Waldersee, and carried out on November 7, 1900. The trial was the only one of its kind held as a result of the intervention, as the punishment of other middle and high-ranking Chinese officials
proceeded on the basis of negotiations between the Qing government and the intervening powers.
Although the Commission has recently received some brief attention by a few dedicated historians, it has so far escaped scrutiny
within the international criminal law community.6 Accordingly, a
number of questions about the trial have remained unanswered.
What actually happened at Paoting-Fu? Was it fair? Why did this
operation, unlike others, result in an international criminal trial?
What meaning did the trial have for the belligerents and the communities they represented? What consequences did the trial have
for the development of international criminal law?
Drawing on previously unexplored material from state archives, published and unpublished missionary correspondence
and military memoirs, and contemporaneous press reports, this
paper addresses these questions in four parts. Part 2 of this article
first sets the scene by briefly describing the state of the armed con5 See Notes on Current Events, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 525
(commenting that if the officials responsible for the massacre can be found guilty
and sentenced to death, it would be “one of the most satisfactory incidents of the
campaign.”).
6 See Jérome Bourgon, Obscene Vignettes of Truth – Construing Photographs of
Chinese Executions as Historical Documents, in VISUALIZING CHINA, 1845–1965:
MOVING AND STILL IMAGES IN HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 46–52 (Christian Henriot &
Wen-hsin Yeh eds., 2013) (discussing the organization of an international commission to investigate the killings of missionaries); JAMES L. HEVIA, ENGLISH LESSONS:
THE PEDAGOGY OF IMPERIALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA 224–29 (2003) (recounting the arrival of an international commission that was set up in Paoting-Fu
to determine the circumstances of the deaths of Western missionaries).
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flict in October 1900, then recounts the story of the Commission’s
day-to-day operation, culminating in the execution of three Chinese officials. Part 3 sets the trial in its legal, cultural and strategic
context, positioning it as an event framed by, among other factors,
the concomitant coherence of international criminal law and a shift
in thinking about the role of collective punishment in war. Part 4
highlights how the relevant constituencies viewed the trials, and
traces the influence of this seminal experiment with individual accountability for international crimes on later efforts to create an international jurisdiction to try the Kaiser in the wake of the First
World War. Finally, Part 5 explores the judicial character and fairness of the Commission.
2. JUSTICE AT PAOTING-FU
The Boxers, named for their distinct martial art style, were a secret society that capitalized on the hardships resulting from prolonged drought, floods and poor harvests to galvanize popular
opinion against foreigners in fin de siècle China. Initially suppressed by the Qing government, the Boxers achieved first a détente with, and eventually the patronage of, the Chinese court.
Throughout June and early July 1900 anti-foreign violence escalated in China’s Chili province as Boxers, with Imperial imprimatur,
attacked Christian missionaries and Chinese converts, and participated in the attacks on the foreign legations in Peking.7 The refusal
of the Chinese government to discourage or punish Boxer violence
against foreign nationals, as well as the threat of imminent Boxer
and Imperial attack on the legations in Peking, united wartime
opinion in Europe, the United States, and Japan against “the awful
catastrophe that cast its shadow over the whole world,”8 and inspired an unprecedented joint military intervention.
7 See JOSEPH W. ESHERICK, THE ORIGINS OF THE BOXER UPRISING 302–09 (1988)
(showing that contemporaneous estimates suggest that over the course of the war
Boxers were responsible for approximately 230 Western civilian and 30,000 Chinese deaths). See also Henri Frey, L’Armee Chinoise 17 REVUE DES DEUX MONDES
528, 549 n.11 (1903) (citing similar numbers to Esherick). See also The National Archives of Great Britain [hereinafter NA], Foreign Office [hereinafter FO] 405/104,
No. 107 Sir E. Satow to Marquess of Lansdowne (March 13, 1901) (containing a table
listing the number of missionaries and other men, women, and children murdered
in Peking).
8 Gilbert Reid, The Ethics of the Last China War, 32 THE FORUM 446, 447 (1901).
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By mid-August 1900, Peking and Tientsin had been occupied
by Allied troops and the Dowager Empress and her court were in
exile in Xi’an.9 With the immediate threat to foreigners in these cities abated, the Allied strategy shifted to sending punitive military
expeditions to smaller cities where Boxers and pro-Boxer Imperial
Army elements were thought to operate. Foreign troops cut a violent swath through the countryside, meting out whatever ‘justice’
they saw fit.10 The only limit to the grotesqueries that could be
perpetrated on these expeditions was the imagination of the commanding officers. In one case, a British officer held half of the
headmen of a village hostage until the other half produced “those
whom they considered as the most guilty parties” for trial before a
Chinese magistrate.11 Other commanders preferred collective punishment, destroying physical symbols of local pride and power, including temples, city walls and gates, and pagodas. Still others
adopted a scorched earth policy, whereby villages associated with
Boxers were simply burnt to the ground and their inhabitants subjected to extensive depredations.12
9 PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS 15–56 (1997). These occupations
were marked by mass plunder, rape, and violence. Id.
10 War Department, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1901. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900,
part 4 [hereinafter ARWD 1901] 495–498 ‘Roster of All Expeditions Made by Allied Forces, December 12, 1900 to May 10, 1901’ (outlining the forty-plus expeditions in late 1900 and early 1901 and showing the overwhelming majority being
done unilaterally by Germany with only seven consisting of mixed forces). During some expeditions missionaries and local magistrates cooperated to sentence
Boxers or obtain monetary settlements for deaths or damage to mission property.
See, e.g., Id. at 491 (‘Adjunct, Camp Reilly, from Wm. Lee Karners’); Id. at 501 (‘Report of Operations in China from November 30, 1900, to May 19, 1901, by Maj.
Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S.A.’).
11 See Department of State, No. 64 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay (April 15, 1901), Inclsoure with dispatch No. 64, Maj. H. Gould-Adams, special-service officer, to the general officer commanding Third Brigade, C. F. F. (April 9, 1901), in Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1901: Affairs in China. Report of William W. Rockhill, Late
Commissioner to China, with Accompanying Documents 129 (1902) (providing an
officer’s detailed report of the event).
12
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 173–210 (recounting scenes of rampant
death and brutality in Chinese cities caused by foreign troops); 7 BATTLES OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 623–636 (special ed. 1901) (describing invasions of Taku
Forts, the battles around Tientsin, and the capture and occupation of Peking);
GEORGE LYNCH, THE WAR OF THE CIVILIZATIONS, BEING A RECORD OF A "FOREIGN
DEVIL'S" EXPERIENCE WITH THE ALLIES IN CHINA 41–47, 177–92, 207 (1901) (recounting the terrible looting and torture that British soldiers did to Chinese villagers);
ARTHUR H. SMITH, 2 CHINA IN CONVULSION 567–68, 577–78 (1901) (describing the
destruction and pillage of the city T’ung Chou). See also Treatment of Chinese Prisoners and Wounded, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, July 21, 1900, at 7 (“. . . all prisoners
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When it was announced in October 1900 that Paoting-Fu, the
provincial capital located approximately 85 miles southwest of Peking, would be the target of a punitive expedition, most observers
expected the harshest of possible fates to befall the city. Paoting-Fu
had reportedly served as a fallback position for Imperial troops already bested by Western forces.13 More critically, the city was
known to have been a hotbed of Boxer activity; by October, the city
was notorious for the brutal attacks on American and British missionaries that had been perpetrated there some months before
(Chinese Christians had been attacked as well, but it was stories of
the attacks on Western missionaries that captured foreign interest).
Reports (exaggerated) that missionary children “were butchered
before their parents’ eyes, white women were ravished and carried
into captivity, mothers and fathers were tortured and murdered.”14
They shocked the foreign community in China, as it did the Western world, and it was widely expected that the city would be destroyed in retaliation.15 Finally, concern that missionary families
taken [were] shot, the brutalities practiced by the enemy on European wounded
who fall into their hands justifying such a drastic measure.”).
13
See Proposed Further Operations, THE TIMES, Sept. 10, 1900, at 3 (reporting
that the Western military was organizing an expedition to Paoting-Fu, where the
Chinese were reported to be massing).
14
Massacres at Pao-Ting-Fu, THE TIMES, Sept. 12, 1900, at 3 (“Surely the civilized world will not suffer this cruel massacre to remain unavenged and raise no
hand to ascertain the fate of the poor martyred Christians and white women”).
The Lahore Tribune stands out among papers responding to the Paoting-Fu massacre for its effort at establishing a counter-narrative. The Tribune positioned the
massacres at Paoting-Fu as a reaction to Western hypocrisy, aggrandizement, opportunism, imperialism, and violence. China and the Chinese, THE TRIBUNE, Aug. 2,
1900, at 2.
15 See Allied Forces in China, MANCHESTER COURIER AND LANCASHIRE GENERAL
ADVERTISER, Sept. 13, 1900, at 6 (reporting that “severe measures” and “a terrible
lesson” were anticipated); The Crisis in China, THE TIMES, Aug. 27, 1900, at 3 (reporting widespread support for a punitive expedition to Paoting-Fu and the destruction of that city); Paotingfu Expedition, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 18, 1900,
at 5 (“If ever a city deserved condign punishment it was Paotingfu.”). See also National Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter: NARA], R[ecord]
G[roup] 59/ M[icrofilm] 102/R[oll Number] 6, No. 312 Fowler, US Consul in Chefoo, to Hill (August 14, 1900) (transmitting firsthand accounts of murders at Paoting-Fu); NARA, RG 59/M102/R6, No. 352 Fowler to Hill (September 18, 1900)
(urging a military expedition to Paoting-Fu be organized, as “[w]e have evidence
enough to hang the Empress Dowager in any Court of law. If she escapes her just
desserts it will be only to punish us for our kindness”), forwarded to Secretary of
War at NARA, RG 59/130 Secretary of State John Hay to the Secretary of War Elihu
Root (Oct. 29, 1900).
It was not uncommon for Westerners to declare that the city should be razed
to the ground. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Records
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were still trapped in the city lent the expedition an air of urgency
absent from other field operations.16
On October 12, 1900, Alfred von Waldersee, Field-Marshal in
command of Allied forces in China, dispatched approximately
6,000 soldiers in two columns from Tientsin and Peking with the
objectives of (1) crushing the Boxers; (2) liberating the captive
Westerners; and (3) punishing Paoting-Fu.17 These columns met
[hereinafter ABCFM], Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124, Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It
does not appear to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a
punitive expedition should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enormities against the nations have been committed.”). See also NARA, RG
59/M102/R6, No. 335 Fowler to Hill (September 5, 1900) (discussing the deaths of
missionaries in Paoting-Fu and stating that “if this massacre is true, then it will be
the duty of our Government to raze that City to the ground.”) forwarded to President McKinley at RG 59/130, Acting Secretary of State David J. Hill to Secretary to the
President George Cortelyou (September 8, 1900). See also Thomas F. Millard, Punishment and Revenge in China, 29 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 187, 189 (1901) (reporting on the
tendency of foreign residents in China to call for the razing of Paoting-Fu).
16 See No. 210 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury, in CHINA NO. 5
(1901), FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN CHINA (HMSO
1901) 126–27 (1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 5] (suggesting that native Christians
and possibly also European missionaries were holding out for the preceding two
months against the Boxers and in some cases were still besieged and in danger of
massacre); No. 335 Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury, in
CHINA NO. 1 (1901) FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN
CHINA (HMSO 1901) 151, 151 (1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 1] (“The withdrawal of
all troops now would mean a general massacre of all converts and such Chinese
as have shown themselves friendly to foreigners.”). See also No. 348 Consul Carles
to the Marquess of Salisbury, in Id. at 159 (describing Carles’s uncertainty regarding
the fates of missionaries remaining in Paoting-Fu); China’s Paying Guests, PEKING
AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Sept. 29, 1900, at 82 (“while we are lingering around loot auctions, and discussing minutæ of plans which never seem to be carried out, there
are still two parties of our countrymen and women lying virtual prisoners in the
hands of the Chinese.”).
17 A copy of Waldersee’s order may be found in the Archivo Dell’uficio Storico Dello Stato Maggiore Dell’esercito [hereinafter AUSSME], E-3, [Rac]coglitore
52, [fol]der 2, ‘Due Ordini Del Comte Delle Forze Internazionale in Cina Gen
Wardersee All’Oggetto: operazione di Pao-Ting’. With respect to punishment, the
order states that Gaselee was to (1) perpetrate neither violence against the inhabitants nor “requisition against the rules”, and (2) punish Boxers “with maximum
severity.” There is no mention as to the form that punishment should take, who
should be punished (All Boxers? All suspected Boxers? All Boxer collaborators,
including government officials?), and for what acts. See also CHINA NO. 5, supra
note 16, at 32, No. 54 General Sir A. Gaselee to India Office (“Under orders of FieldMarshal I am to exact at provincial capital reparation for murder missionary converts [sic].”); Id. at 44, No. 80 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury (explaining that operation was to “bring rescue to the missionaries there” and “avenge
upon the town the massacres of last July.”). James William Jamieson, British Consul at Shanghai, accompanied General Gaselee and later reported that the troops
had set out to punish the city and “determine the guilt of such persons concerned
in these massacres as were to be found on the spot.” Inclosure No. 1, Memoran-
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up just outside of the city on October 19, 1900, where they were
approached by a deputation of civic officials and prominent Chinese citizens.18 The fantai (provincial treasurer and, in this case,
acting governor) Ting Yung, eager to forestall the occupation of his
city, offered to provision the soldiery with food and other supplies
if they remained outside the city. But British General Alfred Gaselee, who had assumed overall command of the French, German,
Italian, and British troops, insisted on entering and inhabiting the
city. Thus overcome, Ting Yung assured him that the occupation
would be a bloodless affair and offered to loan the General his sedan chair for his entry into Paoting-Fu, an honor General Gaselee
brusquely refused.19
The next day Gaselee led his cavalcade of Allied troops
through the city’s maze-like streets. The march should have been
one of the high points of the campaign, but in the absence of arrests, fighting, or executions there was little satisfaction in the exercise. Press reports from the frontline were subdued and generally
preoccupied with the contrast between the punishment Paoting-Fu
‘deserved’ and the unremarkable reality of the orderly transfer of
power to the occupiers. From the Pall Mall Gazette:
It was a miserable morning. As we filed in, the horses in
the van churned the road into mud, and the mud presently
became slush, while as the rain increased our splashed and
bedraggled appearance was altogether out of keeping with
the dignity of the Powers. Indeed, there was no doubt that
the procession of our generals through the streets of a Chinese city was as preposterous as occurrence as anything . . .
The Allied procession arrived in due course at the city
gates, where a group of Chinese officials in Sedan chairs
were ready to meet them, chief among whom was the acting Treasurer of the Province, a man whose iniquities and
cruelties to missionaries should have made him a subject
more fitted for the gallows than for the pleasing duty of
dum of Mr. Jamieson’s Visit to Paoting [hereinafter JAMIESON MEMORANDUM], No. 40
Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury, in CHINA NO. 6 (1901), in FURTHER
CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN CHINA (HMSO 1901) 15, 16
(1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 6].
18 See Annex 2, Figure 1.
19 See Dr. T. J. N. Gatrell, The Expedition to Paotingfu, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan.
17, 1901, at 148 (describing the instance from General Gaslee’s interpreter’s perspective).
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meeting the generals of the Allied forces in an official capacity. We know this man to have maltreated and personally persecuted the unfortunate missionaries who fell into
his power; nevertheless. . ., the whole of Europe was
abashed and degraded in the face of such a man . . .
. . . As another pleasant way of making manifest their
opposition to the precepts of Christianity, the Chinese in
Pao-ting-fu caused the death of fourteen missionaries,
among whom were four women, upon whose bodies, both
before and after death, the most outrageous atrocities were
committed . . . With the memory of these events still fresh
in the minds of the inhabitants of the town all that was sufficient . . . was an empty parade of forces, which was accompanied by no endorsement of that policy of firmness
which is said to be the new method of treating with China.
It was an empty show yesterday, devoid of meaning and
the more strikingly a failure because it did not even come
up to the estimate which the Chinese themselves had
thought would be their just punishment.20
What the correspondents did not know was that an investigation into the role local officials had played in the massacre of
Christians had begun even before the international forces entered
the city. According to Captain Grote Hutcheson of the Sixth United States Cavalry, who accompanied General Gaselee as an attaché
and was one of only two US citizens to join in the expedition, as
soon as the two columns had met outside the city, an inquiry into
“the harsh, cruel, and inhuman treatment of foreigners” was commenced.21 The results were “so damaging for officials and the in20 Angus Hamilton, Pao-Ting-Fu, THE PALL MALL GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 1901, at 3.
See also The Pao-Ting-Fu Expedition, THE TIMES, Dec. 26, 1900, at 9 (“The Chinese are
going about the streets as if they had done nothing; they laugh as you pass by,
they hustle up against your horse; if one could understand their language, doubtless they are calling you all sorts of filthy and disgusting names.”). Another correspondent noted more outright hostile behaviors: “Though Pao Ting Fu had been
occupied without opposition, it was plainly apparent to the most casual observer
that the Chinese were in a very disturbed state. Europeans going through the city
were received with insolent and insulting remarks, and on several occasions were
the objects of spitting, a favorite form of insult.” Marching to Pao Ting Fu, THE LOS
ANGELES HERALD, Dec. 13, 1900, at 3.
21 ARWD 1901, supra note 10, at 466, Report on the Paotingfu Expedition and
Murder of American Missionaries at that place [hereinafter HUTCHESON REPORT].
Hutcheson’s report is also available in NARA, RG 395/913. See also NARA, at RG
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habitants generally that it seemed some steps in the way of punishment” were called for.22 As the preliminary inquiry revealed
that the number of Americans deceased surpassed those of any
other country, Gaselee sought Hutcheson’s opinion “as to the punishment of any persons guilty of atrocious conduct.”23 Hutcheson
replied that he could not speak on behalf of his government, but
that:
First. In my opinion the United States would uphold the
prompt punishment of any officials whose guilty connivance was clear and plain, provided such punishment was
meted out for the purpose of example and not to satisfy any
petty feeling of revenge or retribution.
Second. That any steps General Gaselee thought necessary
and proper under the circumstances would in my opinion
meet with the approval of and be indorsed by [commander
of US forces] General Chaffee; and
Third. That in view of the tense state of feeling because of
the stories of the atrocious treatment and brutal murder of
missionaries that had come to light, I suggested that a
commission or board of inquiry should be instituted to
395/911, Special Order No. 55 signed by Adjunct General Chafee (11 Oct. 1900)
(Ordering Captain Grote Hutcheson and 1st Lieutenant Soulard Turner to accompany the Paoting-Fu expedition).
That the US declined to contribute troops to the expedition was considered a
betrayal by the missionary refugee community in Peking. Reverend Perkins remarked that “[t]he US attitude…lacks in seriousness and seems to come from the
same source that disbelieves in all punishment and would leave everything to
moral maxim. I think it would not take this attitude had it lost heavily in commercial ways.” ABCFM, at Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 7 Perkins to Smith (November 30,
1900). From the correspondence of medical missionary Henry Porter: “The lesson
of the assembly of the nations here had scarce been appreciated by the [Chinese]
Court. Of course the Missionaries felt, as did the general public in China that the
terrible massacre of American and other citizens at Pao Ting and in Shanshi
should not pass without its real and fruitful lesson and result. That Americans
should consider it a matter of no importance that those dear ladies should be
killed in cool blood by the acting Governor of a province, or that China should
consider every man defending his life as a fit subject for beheading with indignity,
seemed to us an impossibility. . . . It seemed a small matter for the Americans to
take a reasonable interest in the effort to find out at least whether her citizens
were still living.” ABCFM, supra note 15, at Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124, Porter to
Smith (Oct. 10, 1900).
22 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 463.
23 Id. at 463.
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make an impartial examination into the conduct of the officials and any other accused persons, and whose report and
recommendation might serve as a basis for action.24
Gaselee answered that the same idea had occurred to him and
on October 21 he established an International Commission to
“make inquiry into the treatment of the foreigners of various nations who had suffered” at Paoting-Fu.25
Although the Commission did not formally meet until October 23, and there is no indication that provincial administrators
were directly informed that they were susceptible to punishment,
it was obvious to them that the walls were closing in. The highestranking members of the local government used their remaining
time to make what efforts they could to secure foreign patronage.
Newspaper correspondents from the United States were treated to
generous accommodations, translators and guides, as well as letters of introduction that ensured that they would remain unmolested in their travels throughout Chili.26 They were in turn
pumped for information about their European occupiers and felt
out for their own views on the expedition, presumably in the hope
that they might endeavor to persuade the United States, which had
declined to contribute troops to the expedition, to intervene in favor of the Chinese officials.27 The frontline report of the US correId.
Id. Gaselee was anxious that punishment not derail peace negotiations in
Peking, and he sought then-British delegate Claude MacDonald’s opinion as to
how to deal with Ting Yung in the event he was found guilty.
See
NA, PRO 30/33/7/9 Jamieson to MacDonald (October 20, 1900) (showing that Jamieson welcomes an indication of MacDonald’s view as to how to deal with Ting
Yung). I have been unable to locate any reply by MacDonald.
The official French Journal de Marche described the Commission as having
been formed to “investigate the causes of the Boxer movement, the perpetrators of
the massacres of missionaries and Christians, the fire of the Christians [presumably, this refers to the fire that some Christians were burned in], and propose a
strict sanction against culpable parties to Field-Marshall Waldersee.” (trans.
Brockman-Hawe). Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre au Château de Vincennes [SHAT], 11 H 3, Corps Expeditionnaire de Chine – Etat Major de la 2 nd Brigade – Journal de Marche – No. 1, Entry of October 21, 1900, p. 16.
26 See, e.g., Ralph D. Paine, In Desolate China, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 10, 1901, at
21 (“Such extraordinary favors showed that the taotai was trimming his sails, now
that the foreigners had him at their mercy . . . His treatment of a correspondent
was moved by fear was selfishness, no doubt . . . ”); Ralph D. Paine, Taking PaoTing-Fu, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 24, 1901, at 7 (describing one correspondent’s generous treatment by the Chinese in Paoting-Fu).
27 Id.
24
25
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spondent for the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) highlights one such
last-ditch effort to drive a wedge between the United States and the
other Allies, and escape through the gap created. At a dinner attended by himself, the Allied commanders, and the Prefect and
Subprefects of Paoting-Fu,
There were scores of dishes served, but only chopsticks as
weapons of attack, and the tyro made small headway until
he sharpened one of them to use as a harpoon or one-tined
fork. This amused the taotai, who laughed as heartily as if
his death sentence were not already in preparation. Cold
ham and chicken, rice, tea, soup and cakes were sufficient
for a “square meal,” without rashly experimenting with innumerable mysterious compounds.
The taotai asked many questions regarding the foreign
forces, and said that he was grateful to the Americans for
not sending soldiers with the allied expedition. “It shows
that you are a kind hearted people,” he continued. “You do
not want to rob and murder the poor Chinese.”28
Eleventh hour blandishments did not forestall the arrest of the
officials whose hands, it was believed, “instead of restraining, actually guided and goaded the maddened rioters” responsible for
Christian deaths.29 Within three days of the Allied parade through
the city, four provincial leaders were placed under arrest. 30 The
names and positions of the accused were recorded by Hutcheson:
1. Ting Yung – “the fantai or provincial treasurer, formerly
and at the time the niehtai or provincial judge”
2. Quei Heng – “the chief tartar official of the city”
3. Wan Chan Kuei – “a lieutenant colonel in the Chinese
army”
4. Shen Chia Pen – “the niehtai or provincial judge, but
prefect at time of murders.”31
28 Id. The taotai was reluctant to discuss the massacres; he “would say no
more than that the Boxers alone were responsible for their deaths.”
29 ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, NEW FORCES IN OLD CHINA: AN UNWELCOME BUT
INEVITABLE AWAKENING 209 (1904).
30 Id.
31 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 472 (emphasis added). Hutcheson also
reported that T’an Wen Huan “the present taotai, who it is alleged sent money
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The International Commission before which they were tried
was comprised of German, Italian, British, and French nationals,
though the precise makeup of the body remains unsettled. In his
communications home, Hutcheson listed the Commission’s membership as follows: General Bailloud (French army), Colonel Ramsey (British (Indian) army), Lieutenant Colonel Salsa (Italian army),
Major von Brixen, (German army), and J. W. Jamieson (civilian,
British consul at Shanghai).32 There is no reason to disbelieve that
French General Maurice Bailloud was President,33 or doubt the fact
of von Brixen’s participation. But inconsistencies among certain
archival sources, as well as between these documents and public
sources, cast doubt on Hutcheson’s identification of the Italian and
British Commissioners. The Commission’s procès-verbal (“Session
Records”), as recorded by the Italian Lieutenant Sambuy,34 suggests that he, not Colonel Salsa, was Italy’s man on the Commission.35 These records, in conjunction with the private journal of
British Captain Francis Poole, also suggest that it was Poole alone
who represented the British (as a substitute for Ramsey, who fell
ill); Jamieson’s name appears nowhere within them.36 Notably, the
and arms from Tientsin for boxers at Paotingfu” was sent by the Commission to
Tientsin for trial. Id. at 467.This decision, if it was made by the Commission in its
formal capacity, was not memorialized in the Session Records. The ambiguity in
the record is discussed in greater detail in infra note 65.
32 Jamieson was described by Sir E. Satow as “a very competent Chinese
scholar” who was “not popular with the men of his own service, [and who] in fact
appears to be the object of universal dislike among his equals.”
NA, PRO 30/33/14/11, No. 43 Satow to Bertie (November 8, 1900). See generally
THE ANGLO-AFRICAN WHO'S WHO AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHBOOK (David Saffery
ed., Walter H. Wills comp., reprint 2006) (1907) (sketching briefly the biography of
Jamieson).
33 According to war correspondent George Lynch, Major-General George
Richardson was initially selected as President, “but on the French remarking that
‘Il y va de l’honneur de France’ [the honor of France is at stake] he withdrew in favour of the French commander.” Lynch, supra note 12, at 204.
34 The “Session Records” that comprise Annex 1 of this paper are a translation of “Commissione Internazionale D’inchiesta Circa Il Massacro Di Cristiani”
found in the AUSSME, E-3, Rac 54, fol 40 (Federico Solchi trans.). The diary of
Captain né Commissioner Poole contains fragments of these procès-verbal. National Army Museum, ‘Microfilm diary of Capt (later Lt Col) F G Poole, Middlesex Regiment, at Peking, China, 1900; associated with the 3rd China War (Boxer
Rebellion) (1900–1901)’ [hereinafter POOLE DIARY].
35 See generally Annex 1 (also suggesting that Sambuy was a substitute for
Italian Major Agliardi, not Salsa).
36 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, at diary entry of October 26, 1900. He was
originally secretary for the Commission. Id. at Letter to Mother of Nov. 25, 1900.
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Session Records align with the identities of those acknowledged as
Commissioners in a sketch of the Commission at work that appeared in the January 19, 1900 Supplement to The Graphic, itself
based on a drawing sent in by an unnamed British soldier.37 Yet
Jamieson, consistent with Hutcheson’s Report, described himself as
a Commissioner in his own brief account of the Paoting-Fu operation.38
Missionary literature suggests that Reverend James Walter
Lowrie, an American who accompanied Gaselee’s troops as an interpreter, was de facto a Commissioner as well; “To the people he
appeared to have the power of life and death. All examinations
had to be conducted through him. All accusations and evidence
had to be sifted by him” recalled the missionary Arthur Brown
several years later.39 But this source is best approached with a
boulder of salt; Brown also describes Lowrie as “the only man [on
the Commission] who could speak Chinese, and the only one, too,
who personally knew the Chinese,” a blatant falsehood assuming
Mr. Jamieson’s involvement, as well as that of Dr. Gatrell, a British
interpreter with the expedition who wrote in his letters that he was
“busy on investigation all the time.”40 The most likely scenario is
37 See Annex 2, Figure 4. Jamieson may be the unnamed British official standing in the background. One of Gaselee’s translators described Jamieson as “the
interpreter at the court.” Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149.
38 JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17. Jamieson was under orders to accompany the expedition as “Political Adviser to General Gaselee” in which capacity he was to provide counsel as to “the most effective measures of punishing the
city in certain given contingencies.” Id. He arrived in Paoting-Fu with suggestions for punishment already drafted, including (1) the execution of those concerned in murders of missionaries and converts, (2) destruction of the four corners
of the city walls, (3) destruction of the gate towers, (4) burning of the temple of the
guardian spirit of the town and (5) levying a fine on the city. CHINA NO. 6, supra
note 17, at 17, Inclosure 2 Memorandum, No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury.
39 ARTHUR J. BROWN, REPORT OF A VISITATION OF THE CHINA MISSIONS 7–8 (3rd
ed.1901). Lowrie, upon seeing the five imprisoned, wrote “I am frank in saying
that I do not feel any impulse in seeking their reprieve, so horrid was their crime,
and so important is it that future mandarins should realize this responsibility of
protecting foreigners’ lives, where possible, rests on them personally.” The Story
of Paotingfu, THE ASSEMBLY HERALD, Feb. 1901, at 61, 62.
40 Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149. A further hint that Lowrie’s role in the
Commission was overstated comes to us in the form of a breathless eulogy from
William Ellis. Ellis credits the minister, who “cherished no bitterness in his heart
toward the poor, deluded people who had so foully ravaged his him and slain his
closest friends and dearest comrades,” with single handedly convincing the commanders at Paoting-Fu to spare the city, but tells us “the missionary himself refuses modestly to talk about it, disclaiming merit for what he did, and declaring
that the saving of the city was by no means his work alone.” William Ellis, How a
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that Lowrie was used as a translator by the investigators, and his
role was subsequently exaggerated to nurture a missionary
metanarrative of strength and mercy in the wake of the mass killings.41
Over the course of seven sessions the Commissioners directed
the investigation and heard the evidence against the accused. Interrogations were brief and not subtle. The fantai was bluntly
asked, for example, why he did not assist the (missionary) Bagnall
family, “becoming in this way an indirect accomplice of their
deaths.”42 The question encapsulates the approach of the Commissioners: capital sentences were considered appropriate where, as
here, those high in authority had reinforced any single link in the
chain of events that led to the massacres.
The guilty verdicts were rendered on a rolling basis. The
Commissioners’ minds were made up about Quai Heng (Chief Tartar) and Wan Chan Kuei (Lieutenant-Colonel in the Imperial Army) by the end of their third session. Death was recommended for
the former in light of his indirect support of the Boxer movement
on the fantai’s evidence that Boxers had organized themselves in
the Tartar court. Lieutenant-Colonel Wan was convicted on the
basis of witness statements that his soldiers, either with his explicit
or tacit consent, handed over an English missionary family (the
Bagnalls) to the Boxers. His defense that he had transferred them
to the Imperial army, over which he had no control, was unavailing.43 The Commissioners deposed Ting Yung, the fantai, during
their second session, when he evaded answering a series of pointed
questions concerning his support for the Boxers and neglect in protecting American and European missionaries.44 Ting Yung was
Princeton Man Saved a City, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Apr. 21, 1915, at 680.
41 For more on representations of Boxer punishments in missionary discourse, see James L. Hevia, Leaving a Brand on China: Missionary Discourse in the
Wake of the Boxer Movement, MODERN CHINA, July 1992, at 305 (arguing that missionary discursive practices were intended to, and in fact did, shape reality as opposed to merely passively reflecting or mirroring it).
42 Annex 1, Second Session.
43 Annex 1, Third Session. See also HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466,
which describes the Colonel as “the military commander of the cavalry camp
where the Bagnell family repaired without avail for refuge, and by whom their
silver and other valuables were removed.” Quai Heng was “one of the most
prominent men to offer moral, financial, and official aid to the Boxer movement.”
44 George Lynch hints at an aspect of the fantai’s defense in his post-war publication that does not appear in the Session Records: “That past master of equivocation . . . declared that no foreign lives had been taken within the city. The explanation lies in the fact that those unfortunate missionaries were just conducted
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condemned, however, at the fourth session after being confronted
with a copy of a telegram he sent to the Emperor stating that he
lacked the resources to kill the Christians.45 Shen Chia Pen, the
neitai, was to be removed from office at the same time.46
The Session Records paint a picture of a Commission that
struggled to find witnesses against the accused (with the exception
of the case against Wan Chan Kuei) or identify additional individuals who should be investigated. This experience was consistent
with that of Hutcheson, who noted a number of variables that confounded his ability to put together his final Report on the events
that transpired in Paoting-Fu:
It must also be borne in mind that the events to be described happened nearly four months ago, and, except in a
general way have passed from the minds of most people
here; that immediately following the occurrences they were
much talked about, so that different versions and stories
were currently believed to be true; that the principal actors
have fled; that few persons can now be found who will admit having been present; and above all the slight regard in
which the truth is held by the Chinese people.47
without the boundaries, and there met their fate.” Lynch, supra note 12, at 204.
45 The authors of China Under the Empress Dowager published a letter, purportedly between Chinese officials in early July, 1900, in which it is stated that
Ting Yung
was largely responsible for the beginning of the trouble. I hear that
about ten days ago he sent for all his subordinates to attend at his
Yamên, and the Prefect of Hsüanhua, who was passing through, came to
pay his respects with the others. This man said, ‘in the reign of the Chia
Ch’ing there were heterodox cults of this kind, and the Emperor ordered
them to be suppressed.’ T’ing Yung replied, ‘circumstances alter cases.
Why should you now refer to those days?’ The Prefect answered him, ‘It
is quite true that the calendar is no longer the same as it was at that time,
but the enlightened principles laid down by our sacred ancestors should
be a guidance to us for ever.’ T’ing had of course nothing to say, and
could only glare at him in silence and change the conversation.
J. O. P. BLAND & E. BACKHOUSE, CHINA UNDER THE EMPRESS DOWAGER 247–48 (1911).
46 Annex 1, Fourth Session.
47 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21 at 468. In the earliest draft of his report,
dated October 22, 1900, Hutcheson states that he had at that time received “no direct testimony of eyewitnesses . . .” Over the course of the next few days at least
one eyewitness must have come forward, as this language was changed in the final version, dated October 25, 1900, to “little direct testimony of eyewitnesses . . .”
NARA, RG 395/906, Grote Hutcheson, ‘Pao-ting-fu China, Oct. 22, 1900 - State-
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There are nevertheless some indications that the accused were
convicted on the basis of more evidence than was memorialized in
the Session Records. Gatrell wrote that the written testimonies of
the Green family (who had been freed by the French soldiers approximately one week previously) “went a long way toward bringing about [the] punishment” of Ting Yung and the other officials,
that “everyone [he interviewed] laid the blame on the Fan t’ai,”48
and that testimony which directly implicated Ting Yung and Quei
Heng was “brought up against” them.49 He mentioned other evidence that would have been critical to a conviction; testimonies
which, despite being “contradictory in parts,” were in general
agreement that “the people of the villages immediately around the
compounds took a large share in the work of destruction.”50 Additionally, former German Army Lieutenant Alfred von Müller, in
his post-war retrospective, listed among the sources of evidence relied upon “the testimony of the French missionary Pére Du Mont,
who barely escaped death,” as well as the “concurring testimony of
ment of the Death of American Missionaries’ (October 22, 1900). Reverend Arthur
Brown, who travelled to China in 1901 to assess the state of the Presbyterian
Church in the aftermath of the widespread attacks on missionaries, put together
his own account of the events at Paoting-Fu and explained the difficulties he had
faced in acquiring reliable information:
None of the foreigners live to tell the painful story. No other foreigners
reached Paotingfu until the arrival of the military expedition in October,
three and a half months later. The Chinese who had participated in the
massacre were then in hiding. Spectators were afraid to talk lest they,
too, might be held guilty. Most of the Chinese Christians who had been
with the missionaries were killed, while others were so panic-stricken
that they could remember only the particular scene with which they
were directly connected. Moreover, in those three and a half months
such battles and national commotions had occurred, including the capture of Peking and the flight of the Emperor, that the people of Paotingfu
had half forgotten the murder of a few missionaries in June.
. . . The guilty tried to shift the blame upon the innocent, and enemies
sought to pay off old scores of hatred upon their foes by charging them
with complicity in the massacres.
BROWN, supra note 39, at 3–4, 8. Dr. Peck, a missionary travelling through Paoting-Fu in March 1901, also had a difficult time finding witnesses willing to speak
to him about the violence of summer 1900. He eventually found a local constable
“who saw the affair.” His conclusions are published in North China Mission, THE
MISSIONARY HERALD, June 1901, 244, 245–46.
48 Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149.
49 Id. at 150.
50 Id. at 149.
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numerous Chinese Christians whose women and children had
been killed in gruesome manner by higher level order.” 51 There
may have been additional documentary proof as well; in a January
1901 dispatch, a correspondent for The Times described a damning
communique submitted into evidence in which Ting Yung stated
that he would consider it a “disgrace to himself if one foreigner
was left alive in his district.”52
The Commissioners never issued a final report describing what
happened in Paoting-Fu and clarifying precisely which acts (or
omissions) of the local officials were considered criminal. Jamieson’s expedition report described the activities of all three officials sentenced to capital punishment in strictly passive terms, noting that they had “aided and abetted” the murders by their
“culpable negligence.”53 But this is in tension with the “courtmartial verdict” that appeared (in German) in Alfred von Müller’s
Die Wirren und die Kämpfe der Verbündeten Trüppen (1902). Dated
November 4, 1900, the ‘verdict’ sets forth the following basis for
the convictions:
Sentenced to receiving the death penalty through decapitation are the Fantai Ting Yung, who neither managed to protect Europeans and Chinese Christians, nor to prevent
murder, such as massacre of missionaries, railroad officials
and Christian Chinese; the Tartar Governor Kuli keng
[Quei Heng], who favored and organized the Boxers; the
cavalry colonel Wang chan kuai, who allowed the massacre
of the American missionary Bagnell, along with his wife
and little daughter, who sought refuge in his camp.
The Nientai Shen chia kuai, whose guilt is lesser because of
smaller authority, who however participates no less in the
responsibility for the misdeeds, is removed from his office
and declared void of his rank.54
51 ALFRED VON MÜLLER, DIE WIRREN UND DIE KÄMPFE DER VERBÜNDETEN
TRÜPPEN 432 (1902).
52 The Pao-Ting-Fu Expedition, THE TIMES, Jan. 5, 1901, at 3.
53
JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (“[T]he Commission . . . had
brought before it certain evidence strongly incriminating [the three officials sentence to capital punishment] of having been actually concerned in aiding and
abetting the Boxer movement and thus practically directly responsible for the
murders which took place.”).
54 MÜLLER, supra note 51 (Brockman-Hawe trans.). This verdict, however,
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Both sources are, to some extent, in tension with Hutcheson’s
report, which describes the current fantai, Ting Yung, as having
presented a local Boxer with a gilt button “in the nature of a decoration or badge of distinction” in recognition for his “zeal and energy in the Boxer movement” the day before the massacres. Hutcheson understood that this lent the subsequent carnage “a certain
official sanction.”55 The British Intelligence Department’s “Official
Account” also suggests a heightened responsibility for the former
neitai, noting that Ting Yung “did all in his power to encourage the
Boxers.”56
cannot be regarded as definitive, as Müller never stated whether his reproduction
was copied from an archival source, or based on his own recollection of either the
text of the Chinese language posters hung by the Allies around the city to publicize the sentences or the public read-through of the Commission’s decision done
just prior to the execution. It may be significant though that the published memoires of General Voyron, Commander of the French Expeditionary Forces in China, presented Quei Heng as having been more actively and intimately involved
with the Boxers than his colleagues, and otherwise generally tracks the ‘verdict’:
The Fan-Tai [Ting Yung], who had protected neither Europeans or native
Christians and allowed the massacre at the very gates of the province,
the Tartar governor of the City [Quei Heng], who was a principal organizer of the Boxer movement, and a Tartar cavalry colonel [Wan Chan
Kuei], who had left in his camp the murderers of an American missionary and her family, were beheaded in the presence of detachments of all
the troops of the garrison, at the same place where the British and American missionaries were murdered.
The Nieh-tai, who seemed less guilty than the Fan-Tai, who though second in command still had a share in the responsibility for the disorder,
was deposed and degraded at the same location.
GENERAL VOYRON, RAPPORT SUR L’EXPÉDITION DE CHINE 1900–1901 211 (BrockmanHawe trans.).
Reverend Arthur Smith, who took a great interest in news of the massacres
and punishment of Paoting-Fu, wrote in 1901 of the sentence on “Ting-Jung, who
had been the patron of the Boxer movement for the whole year . . . together with
the Tartar General of the city and the Lieutenant-Colonel of the camp, who had
refused protection to foreigners, and whose soldiers had stood idly by while the
burning of the mission premises and the slaughter of missionaries was in progress.” Arthur H. Smith, China Six Months after the Occupation of Peking, THE
OUTLOOK, Apr. 13, 1901, at 865, 866.
55 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 464.
56 NA, FO 881/9496x, OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
CHINA, 1900–1901 133 (E. W. M. Norie comp., 1903) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
ACCOUNT]. The Account was based on “all official reports and publications . . .
and . . . unofficial diaries and descriptions of various incidents of the campaign.”
Unfortunately, repeated searches of the National Archives have revealed none of
the original reports, publications, journals, etc. that the Intelligence Department
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Thanks to “the officiousness [of a staff] understrapper” the
press was denied entry to the proceedings, accounting for the relative paucity of firsthand accounts of the trial.57 Nonetheless, one
journalist, Luigi Barzini, correspondent for the Italian Corrirere della
Serra, either found a way in or cultivated a contact with first-hand
knowledge of the proceedings.58 His version of the Commission’s
second sitting does not precisely track the Session Records, but it is
consistent enough to warrant reproduction for the flavor of the
proceedings it alone is capable of imparting:
The Fang-tai was accused of having supported anti-Europe
forces.
This magistrate defended himself with a real fury in front
of the International Military Tribunal. Small, plump, bilious, with numerous words and gestures he worked tremendously to tear any responsibility from his shoulders,
throwing it profusely over the Emperor, Empress, and
Prince Tuan. [Realizing it was a] lost game, he embraced a
leg of the table of the court, as if begging from the table the
justice denied by the white men. The table was, naturally,
Chinese.
The Tar-Tar governor put the court in a good mood. Imagine a seventy-year-old man, deaf as a post, who does not
understand a word unless it is yelled in the left ear of a
servant, especially in charge of this operation, who has the
voice of a terribly shrill musician. The questions from the
judges passed to the interpreter, then from the interpreter
to the servant, and finally from the servant to the governor,
who did not understand.
ostensibly relied on in the course of compiling its chapter on the Paoting-Fu expedition. It thus remains an open question how much the acknowledged “considerable revision and editing” of these sources resulted in a dilution of content, or loss
of subtleties in language and tone that might provide insight into the operation of
the Commission or resolve the tension between sources. Id. at Preface.
57 Lynch, supra note 12 at 204. See also The Execution of Ting Yang, THE JAPAN
WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 25, 1900, at 4 (“In forming an opinion [about the Commission]
we labour under the great disadvantage of not knowing exactly what evidence
was submitted to the court martial.”); Millard, supra note 15, at 192 (“The commission began sitting immediately in secret session. No correspondents were permitted to be present.”).
58 I refer here to Luigi Barzini, Senior (1874–1947) and not to his son (1908–
1984), a famous Italian correspondent in his own right.
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Why—they asked him—have you allowed Boxers
to use rooms in your house for meetings?
My son—he answered—has been in Peking for six
months.
He was also accused of having directly encouraged I-ho
T’ciuan and the Ta-To-Que.
The colonel of cavalry had delivered the American missionary Bagnall and his family to the Boxers. He defended
weakly. He simply asked if they would cut off his head.
They answered yes. Then he made a gesture as if to say:
It's fine!—and withdrew with dignity.59
Ting Yung, Quei Heng, and Wan Chan Kuei were recommended to capital punishment by beheading—the “Chinese method in
vogue for criminals.”60 The Commissioners also advised the destruction of several local sites of religious and civil import, including all the pagodas, buildings and towers along the city walls.61
General Gaselee left for Peking on October 28, 1900 and personally
delivered the recommendations to the Field-Marshal.62
As they waited for Waldersee’s confirmation, residents of Paoting-Fu were treated to the Commission-mandated destruction of a
temple that the Boxers had used for their meetings and as a prison
LUIGI BARZINI, NELL’ESTREMO ORIENTE 306–07 (1904) (Brockman-Hawe
trans.). It is also possible that Barzini did not witness these testimonies himself,
but instead relayed the story as he heard it from someone present at the hearing.
For more on Barzini in China, see SHIRLEY ANN SMITH, ITALIANS IN CHINA, 1900–
1947 at 25–66 (2012), and Piero Corradini, Luigi Barzini e la Guerra dei “Boxers,”
4 CINA 70 (1958).
60 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 465; JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra
note 17 (“The sentence . . . was in the nature of a recommendation to the Field
Marshal, with whom the ultimate decision rested . . . .”).
61 See HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466 (reporting the Commission’s
recommendation that various temples, pagodas, and gates be destroyed as part of
Paoting-Fu’s punishment). See also BROWN, supra note 39, at 9 (“The Generals,
therefore, felt that some punishment must be inflicted upon the city . . . . All of
[the towers on the city wall], but two comparatively small ones, were blown up by
order of the foreign generals. The temples which the Boxers had used for their
meetings . . . were also destroyed, while the splendid official temple of the city . . .
was utterly wrecked by dynamite.”).
62 See JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (indicating that General Gaselee
left Paoting to return to Peking with Jamieson). See also NA, FO 17/1449, Movement of Troops (Nov. 3, 1900) (noting that Waldersee had sent for Gaselee to bring
his battalion to join Waldersee in Shanghai).
59
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for various captured missionaries (Chi-Sheng-An Temple), and the
official temple of the city (Cheng-Huang-Miao Temple).63 Meanwhile the captured officials, who knew nothing of their proposed
fate, ruminated in their cells.64 Reverend Lowrie, passing by the
makeshift prison, observed their sorry state:
[We] looked through the window, . . . and heard [Ting
Yung’s] pitiful sighs and moans as he lifted up this morsel
of food and that only to put it down again untasted. He is a
handsome man of forty-five. A reporter visited him two
days since and after a conversation in which he deplored
his folly in seeking enormous wealth and failing to discover
the empty boasts of the Boxers, he then asked the reporter
to loan him his revolver evidently intending to commit suicide. This I should not be surprised to hear he had done before the day of execution arrives.
In the same . . . [building] . . . is another distinguished criminal under the sentence of death if Count Waldersee approves, which he is almost certain to do, Fair [T’an] Wen
Huan, a taotai of Tientsin. These men together with an old
Manchu Commandant, Keui Hong [Quei Heng], bitterer
even than they, the entire population of the city unite in
judging worthy of death. There is another, Wang Chan
Keui [Wan Chan Kuei], a military man in charge of the
camp east of the city, who stopped the Bagnalls in their
flight, took their valuables and gave themselves over to the
hands of the Boxers.65
63 Annex 1, Third Session. See also HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466
(reporting the Commission’s recommendation that various temples, pagodas, and
gates be destroyed as part of Paoting-Fu’s punishment). It is a mystery why the
Commissioners destroyed these sites without Waldersee’s confirmation, but
awaited his approval for other acts of symbolic punishment.
64 See BROWN, supra note 29, at 209 (noting the irony that these were the very
same rooms that had been utilized by the Presbyterian mission for Sunday services in Paoting-Fu before the violence).
65 The Story of Paotingfu, supra note 39, at 62. The precise relationship between
the Commission and T’an Wen Huan needs to be explored further. Hutcheson’s
Report, Lowrie’s letter home, and news media suggest that his case was decided
by the Commission. See Australians in China, THE EVENING NEWS (SYDNEY), Jan. 28,
1901, at 8 (“Documentary evidence was found in the Yamen that the man had acted as paymaster to the ‘Boxers,’ and he was known to have taken a very active
part in the proceedings generally. While in Pao Ting-Fu, a day later, fresh evidence was found convicting him of his anti-foreign sentiments.”). See also The Po-
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That Waldersee approved the Commission’s recommendations
would have surprised few. This was, after all, a man who described himself as having only two principles of action in the China
theatre: “to treat all Chinese like dogs, and to refuse everything
asked of him by the Russian Minister.”66 On November 6, the
noises of a capital city waking up were punctuated by a series of
explosions; part of the city walls and adorning pagodas had been
blown up. Two hours later Ting Yung, Quei Heng and Wan Chan
Kuei were executed, and Shen Chia Pen was publicly degraded.
Their sentences were carried out with all the theatrics befitting
their status as the first Chinese officials to be punished by Allied
sition of China, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 1900, at 10 (“Tang Wen Huan,
the Provincial Treasurer, who was sentenced to death by the Paoting-Fu military
tribunal, is being brought to Tientsin to be publicly decapitated by the City Government executioner at the request of the Paoting-Fu military authorities.”); De
Midi a Minuit, LE MATIN, Dec. 1, 1900, at 1.
There is, however, no mention of T’an Wen Huan’s case in the Session Records. Moreover, per the minutes of the Tientsin Provisional Government (“TPG”)
meeting of November 26, 1900, he was offered up to the Allied council governing
the city by the Germans and described at that time as having been “tried by a
Chinese court and condemned to be decapitated, the sentence being approved by
the Emperor.” NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of the Seventy Fourth Meeting of the Council of the provisional Government of the Chinese City of Tientsin 64, 66 (Nov. 26, 1900)
[hereinafter TPG].
Although the Council had agreed at that meeting to decapitate the prisoner,
notes from the subsequent December 5, 1900 meeting indicate that the TPG was
furnished “certain documents” by the Chinese, suggesting that a fresh review of
the case accounting for new evidence was undertaken at that time. The TPG affirmed its earlier decision, and apparently felt the need to ensure that his death
was at least as spectacular as that of his peers in Paoting-Fu, as they now ordered
that he should be “marched through the streets with a proclamation stating the
cause of his execution and that “his head be exposed for five days with a copy of
the proclamation.” NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of TPG meeting of Dec. 5, 1900, at 87,
also available at PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES DU CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT
PROVISOIRE DE TIENTSIN [hereinafter PVCGPT] 61 (1911). The actual execution was
also noted in the meeting minutes. See NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of TPG meeting
December 7, 1900, at 88. Their orders were carried out to a tee. See Australians in
China at 8 (reporting that many executions took place). See also Execution of an Official, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Dec. 8, 1900, at 122 (describing the execution of
Tan Wen-huan); The Execution of Tan Wen-Huan, PEKIN AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Dec.
15, 1900, at 126 (describing the execution as welcomed by foreigners and locals
alike).
66 NA, FO 800/119, Colonel Satow to Lord Lansdowne (Dec. 20, 1900) (describing Waldersee’s comments to his English adjunct, Colonel Grierson). Waldersee
wrote in his diary that “[o]nly if one behaves harshly and ruthlessly against [the
Chinese] can one make progress with them.” Annika Mombauer, Wilhelm, Waldersee, and the Boxer Rebellion, in THE KAISER – NEW RESEARCH ON WILHELM II’S ROLE
IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 91, 115 (Annika Mombauer & Wilhelm Deist eds., 2003).
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forces for the “crimes against humanity”67 of previous months:
In the distance, now the sounds of a lively march were audible, international policemen (soldiers with red armbands)
cleared the roads, the troops that were selected to be present during the execution of the three condemned moved
in. Under the burning pagoda, through the mighty gate,
passing by the hills of a Chinese cemetery, the march went
past the destroyed part of the wall, where the execution
was to take place in the presence of the magistrates and
personally led by the police prefect. There the troops assembled in the form of a rectangle open to the wall, French
and German troops side by side. Two sections of German
soldiers, led by an officer, brought the delinquents and
placed themselves with them in the open side of the rectangle. Major von Brixen and Lt. Col. Ramsey stepped forward and read aloud, each in his own language, the judgment of the court-martial as confirmed by Field Marshal
Count Waldersee. The condemned were led into the center
of the rectangle, where the Chinese executioner was waiting for them. There followed successively and with much
circuitousness, thus slowly and mercilessly for the delinquents, the execution of the three condemned, while the
fourth had to watch. The corpses were packed in black coffins, while the heads of three were fixed on high bars,
where they remained until the Chinese people had been
convinced of the enforcement of the judgment. It was impressive how those condemned ones went to their deaths.
With firm steps, but ashen faces, they walked up to the executioner; proudly they looked around before they knelt
down without being forced in order to receive the mortal
blow.
Soon after the retreat of the troops the Chinese rushed to
the execution place and looked respectfully at the heads of
the men, by whom they had previously been oppressed. Silently they crept home, but not without pausing to read the
large posters on the way, which announced the wording of

67 Allied Forces in China, MANCHESTER COURIER
ADVERTISER, Sept. 13, 1900, at 6.
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the judgment in Chinese.68
68 MÜLLER, supra note 51, at 433–34 (Brockman-Hawe trans.). At least three
first-hand accounts of the sentences were published by the press. Two of the three
correspondents were cognizant that what they were witnessing was no mere execution, but a performance intended to send a message, though their responses to
the fact of the staginess and theatricality of the beheadings varied. The unnamed
reporter from The Advertiser relished the martial atmosphere, underlining the acrobatic prowess of the executioner and his assistants, the efficient order to the
proceedings, the evil nature of the deceased, and the merciless nature of the
spared magistrate. See Winter Quarters, THE ADVERTISER, Jan. 22, 1901 at 7 (describing the scene of beheading as magnificent). Barzini painted a more intimate picture, calling attention to the spoken and unspoken behavioral ticks of the parties
involved, humanizing all in the process:

Killing a man is nothing, especially for soldiers, even more so when in
China; watching him be killed is terrible. . . . General von Kettler nervously tapped his boots with his riding stick, committing all of his attention to this gesture. General Bailloud repeated to his neighbors: Mais
c’est bien long, mon Dieu! [But this is taking long, my God!] . . .
Suddenly a large blade, grabbed with two hands, shone in the sun. The
executioner beat the ground with his foot and raised the Sciabola. Twice
he approached the bare neck to make a cut, there was a flash, and then a
thud. . . . The executioner turned toward the members of the military
court, raising his thumb as if to say: ‘this makes one!’ After a few
minutes the three heads of the condemned were hung on top of as many
pikes in the middle of the square. The executioner threw the bloody
sword on the grass, approached the judges, and uttered the sacramental
words: “xing xian fa” [justice has been done!]
Meanwhile, a curious scene took place. The ancient Nieng-tai of PaotingFu, condemned to destitution, seeing himself in the square expected a
terrible punishment. After losing "face," he should have to lose his head.
With Chinese resignation he waited his turn. But after these executions,
[Shen Chia Pen] looked around in wonder, supposing that he had been
forgotten by the axman. The interpreter of the military court told him
that he was to be returned to prison, and that from this point forward he
was no longer a Mandarin, but a Cooley. With every word the interpreter spoke, the old Nieng-tai was filled with superhuman joy; his eyes
sparkled, his cheeks reddened, and his mouth opened up and, with a
smile of bliss, sent exclamations of glad surprise. When the soldiers resumed bringing the new Cooley to prison, he went gleefully, lavishing
bows and smiles to all the Zouaves of his escort.
BARZINI, supra note 59, at 307–13 (my translation from Italian). The correspondent
for Le Petit Parisien provided a third description of the executions. See infra below.
See also Bourgon, supra note 6, at 48–50 (quoting Barzini’s account of the executions); BROWN, supra note 29, at 209 (describing that the Chinese officials were beheaded themselves near where the Western missionaries were beheaded). According to Norie’s Official Account, “[t]he astonishment and horror of the Fen-tai,
when he realized that he was to be executed for his guilt, were almost ludicrous.
It was impossible, to his Chinese mind, that a magistrate of his rank could be in
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3. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND ESSENTIAL CONTEXTS
Why did General Gasalee deviate from the pattern of rough
justice that characterized Allied behavior in China prior to the Paoting-Fu expedition by convening an International Commission?
Although the General left no notes behind to explain his choice,
exploring the Commission’s essential cultural and legal backdrops
provides some hints as to the reasons events may have unfolded as
they did. In this section, I first suggest that, from the perspective of
the commanders and sub-commanders involved in the Paoting-Fu
operation, the Commission was a legally viable option for holding
Chinese officials accountable, as it was compatible with (1) the law
of occupation, (2) the law of diplomatic protection, and (3) emerging principles of international criminal law, as each would have
been interpreted by representatives of the world’s ‘civilized’ powers. I then propose that as a practical matter, the Commission was
an effort to mediate between the humanitarian and revengist sentiments that vied for dominance during the Boxer intervention.
3.1. The Culturo-Legal Context
The conflict in China coincided with a profound transformation
in the law of occupation. The newly minted Convention with respect of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II, 1899),
imposed obligations on commanders, including a general obligation to treat civilians with humanity and a responsibility to respect
local law as they found it.69 But the obligation had not yet been incorporated into any Western military manuals, and the old standard afforded the commanders wide discretion over matters of justice. From the British Manual on Military Law (1899):

such a position, without hope of escape.” OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, supra note 56, at 134.
Le Petit Journal (‘Exécution à Pao-tin-fu,’ illustrated supplement dated 21 January
1901), The Graphic (5 January 1901), and Le Petit Parisien, (‘Les Executions a PaoTing-Fou,’ illustrated supplement dated 20 Jan 1901) depicted the execution. See
also Annex II, Figure 1, 2, and 3.
69 The Hague Convention of 1899 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land art. 43, July 29, 1899 [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION].
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A commander of troops in time of war, and in occupation
of a foreign country, or any part thereof . . . stands temporarily in the position of governor of the country or part of
the country which he occupies. In this latter capacity he
imposes such laws on the inhabitants as he thinks expedient for securing, on the one hand, the safety of his army,
and on the other, the good government of the district
which, by reason of his occupation, is for the time being
deprived of its ordinary rulers.70
As a general rule, the rule of military occupation extends
only to such matters as concern the safety of the army, the
invader permitting the ordinary civil tribunals of the country to deal with ordinary crimes committed by the inhabitants. The course, however, to be adopted in such cases is at
the discretion of the invader. He may abrogate any law of
the country and substitute other rules. He may create special tribunals, or leave the native tribunals to exercise their
usual jurisdiction.
The most important power exercised by the invader occupying a territory is that of punishing, in such manner as he
thinks expedient, inhabitants guilty of breaking the rules
laid down by him for securing the safety of the army.71
GREAT BRITAIN WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 2 (1899).
Id. at 297. The Manual’s broad conception of occupying powers was affirmed by jurists. From Halleck’s International Law:
70

71

Although the laws and jurisdiction of the conquering State do not extend
over such foreign territory, yet the laws of war confer upon it ample
power to govern such territory, and to punish all offences and crimes
therein by whomsoever committed. The trial and punishment of the
guilty parties may be left to the ordinary courts and authorities of the
country, or they may be referred to special tribunals administering martial law, organized for that purpose by the government of military occupation . . .
HENRY WAGER HALLECK, 2 HALLECK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 439–40 (3rd ed. 1893).
See also WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (4th ed.
1895) (“On entering an enemy’s territory an invader replaces the civil government
by military control, and makes any changes which are necessary for his safety and
success”); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 484–85 (4th ed.
1904) (“Military government . . . supersedes, as far as may be deemed expedient,
the local law, and continues until the war or rebellion is terminated”). The British
Manual was also consistent with the U.S. Army’s field guide. L IEUTENANT
COLONEL JOHN BIDDLE PORTER, THE MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 830 (4th
ed. 1901) (“It is authorized by the laws of war for a military officer commanding
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Although Hague II rendered this understanding of the law passé,
old habits of thinking would not have been replaced overnight
even under the best of circumstances. Where, as here, the conflict
involved intervention in the affairs of a semi-civilized state like
China, there would have been even less incentive to evolve.72 At
any rate, Hague II offered its own potential justification for the establishment of the Commission: Article 43 only obliged occupying
powers to respect local law to the extent that doing so did not interfere with their primary obligation to ensure “public order and
safety.”73 It is doubtful that any officer present in Paoting-Fu
in time of war in a region of military occupation, and where the ordinary courts
are closed by the exigencies of the war, to appoint a special court or judge for the
determination of cases not properly cognizable by the ordinary military tribunals.”). The Hague Conventions were not incorporated into the British Manual
until the 1907 reprint.
The German Militärstrafgesetzbuch (Military Code) of 1872 specifically made
foreigners and Germans “in a foreign territory, occupied or garrisoned by German
troops” who commit “an act punishable according to the laws of the German Empire, against German troops or others appertaining to the same, or against any authority constituted by an ordinance of the Emperor” subject to Germany’s domestic criminal law, “as if such act had been committed [in Germany]” (Art. 161).
MILITARY PENAL CODE (MILITAR-STRAFGESETZBUCH) FOR THE GERMAN EMPIRE 50 (W.
Winthrop trans.) (1873). A slightly different translation of Article 161 was given
in ISABEL V. HULL, ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION—MILITARY CULTURE AND THE PRACTICES
OF WAR IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 125 (2005) (“Section 161 of the Military Penal Code
(1872) made ‘all foreigners or Germans in foreign territory occupied by German
troop’ subject to German domestic law, ‘just as if their act had been committed in
Germany”). See also Art. 5(4) Militärstrafgerichtsordnung (Military Procedure Code)
(1898) available in ADOLPH WEISSLER, PREUSSISCHES ARCHIV: SAMMLUNG DER
GESETZE UND DER DAS RECHTSWESEN BETREFFENDEN VERORDNUNGEN UND
VERFÜGUNGEN PREUSSENS UND DES REICHES (1898) (reaffirming Art. 161 of the 1872
Code by providing German court-martials with jurisdiction over natives). The
French Code de Justice Militaire (1857, updated 1875) granted French conseils de
guerre operating in foreign occupied territory jurisdiction over “nationals of the
invaded country, foreigners found there, and French who, being outside of
France, and may not come before the ordinary justice system of the French
courts.” ANDRÉ TAILLEFER, LA JUSTICE MILITAIRE DANS L'ARMÉE DE TERRE EN
FRANCE ET DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PAYS 224 (1895). The Italian Codice Penal (1869)
was more limited, affording martial courts convened during war personal jurisdiction only over persons involved with the military, their servants, prisoners of
war, and anyone who perpetrated some specifically enumerated crimes. C ODICE
PENALE PER L'ESERCITO DEL REGNO D'ITALIA Arts. 545–46 (1869).
72 Nor was China a signatory to Hague II in 1900. Although China had participated in the treaty negotiations, it did not accede to the 1899 Convention until
1907.
73
HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 69, at Art. 43. The obligation to respect
local law was rarely taken seriously in the immediate aftermath of Hague II. For
example, the otherwise law-abiding Japanese gave the provision short shrift dur-
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would have hesitated to declare that provincial officials who participated in mass crimes represented a security threat.74
An expansive concept of diplomatic protection endorsed by
contemporary jurists and backed by extensive state practice also
supported the turn towards foreign justice in China.75 The following from Paul Pradier-Fodéré’s Traité de Droit International Public,
Européen et Américain may as well have been written just for the occasion:
It is the duty of all states to protect their nationals in foreign
countries by all means which international law authorizes.
. . . It owes them such protection when the foreign state has
proceeded against them in violation of the principles of international law: for example, if the foreign state has . . .
Forced them to abjure their religion, if it has despoiled them
of their property, if it has treated them with cruelty. . . . It
ought to protect them even when the bad treatment or
damages sustained by its nationals are not directly the act
of the foreign state . . . But of persons having a private character . . . From this results . . . the right to obtain justice by
force, if it cannot be done otherwise. . . . Whoever maltreats
a citizen indirectly offends the state which ought to protect
this citizen. The sovereign of such citizen ought to avenge
his injury, and compel, if he can, the aggressor to make entire reparation or punish him. . . . To oppose the acts which
caused the damage, to make reparation, or to punish the authors,
the state of the offended persons [ . . . may go] even to war.76
ing the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), during which they tried dozens of “treasonous” Chinese before military courts applying martial law in Japanese occupied
territories of neutral China. NAGAO ARIGA, LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE AU POINT
DE VUE CONTINENTAL ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL D'APRÈS LES DOCUMENTS
OFFICIELS DU GRAND ÉTAT-MAJOR JAPONAIS (SECTION HISTORIQUE DE LA HUERRE DE
1904–1905) 378 (1908).
74
Field-Marshal Waldersee would later declare that setting up an interAllied criminal tribunal in the occupied city of Tientsin was “in perfect accordance” with Hague II. No. 98 Count von Waldersee to M. de Cologan, May 25, 1901, in
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901. AFFAIRS IN CHINA. 179, at 179–80 (1902).
75
See generally MILTON OFFUTT, THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1928). See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING
FORCES 26–34 (2nd rev. ed. 1929) (summarizing the state of the doctrine) [hereinafter RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS].
76
RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS, supra note 75, at 26–27 (emphasis added)
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Most significantly, by 1900 entanglements between the notions
of humanity, mass violence, personal accountability and punishment had reached such a critical density that allegations of criminal responsibility for acts of massacre could conceivably be anchored in international law. In fact, the Commission emerged
against the backdrop of negotiations between Western powers and
the Qing government over the question of punishment of Boxers
and their supporters. The record of negotiations reveals the extensive degree of consolidation that international criminal law had
undergone by the turn of the century.
Allied negotiators in Peking were slow to reach consensus on
questions of punishment, as questions over who should punish the
Chinese and how guilt should be determined proved to be significant points of contention.77 A September 1900 German proposal
that negotiations with China be deferred until the Imperial Government handed over for trial by the Powers “first and real perpetrators” involved in the “crimes committed in Pekin against international law” (including the murder of German Ambassador
Clemens von Ketteler, the attack on the Peking legations, and the
murder of missionaries) failed to find purchase with most of the
Allies.78 Only the Italians agreed that “the punishment of the most
(translating and citing 1 PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC, EUROPÉEN ET AMÉRICAIN—SUIVANT LES PROGRÈS DE LA SCIENCE ET DE LA
PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINES 614–630 (1885–1906)). Francis J. R. Mitchell, International Liability for Mob Injuries, 34 AM. L. REV. 709 (1900) (“Should satisfaction, for
any reason, even for a defect in the organization of the government, be refused
under such circumstances, the State so refusing gives to the claimant State a just
cause for resorting to reprisal or even to war, to enforce her claim, and moreover
forfeits her right to the benefits of international law and to a place among the civilized nations of the world.”).
The German Criminal Code of 1871 embodied an understanding that “when a
foreigner has committed a crime in a desert, or in another state which refuses to
use its right of punishment, and thus deprives the Empire or its dependents of a
legitimate satisfaction, the Empire acquires a natural right of punishing that foreigner.” GEOFFREY DRAGE, THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE TRANSLATED
WITH PROLEGOMENA AND A COMMENTARY 90 (1885).
77
For a more detailed exploration of punishment in the negotiation of the
Boxer Protocol, see CHESTER TAN, THE BOXER CATASTROPHE 137–56, 216–23 (1967)
and JOHN S. KELLY, A FORGOTTEN CONFERENCE: THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PEKING 1900 –
1901 135–49 (1962).
78
CHINA NO. 1, supra note 16, at No. 168 Count Hatzfeldt to the Marquess of
Salisbury (Sept. 18, 1900) (arguing that a massacre of those “employed as instruments to carry out the criminal work” would go against “civilised conscience,”
but that the punishment of a few “instigators and leaders” whose guilt was “notorious” would have a salutary effect). The extradition demand originated with
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culpable of the crimes committed against humanity in China and
against the rights of nations” should be a preliminary condition.79
The Russians deemed the demand an “anomaly” and joined the
United States in criticizing it as impractical and shortsighted, given
that “punishment by the Central Imperial authority would have a
far greater effect throughout the whole Chinese Empire.”80 The
German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bü1ow, who made the suggestion initially as a ploy to derail the embryonic negotiations until the German Field Marshal
arrived in China to assume control of the international forces that had been deployed there. No. 184, Count von Bülow to Emperor Wilhelm II (Sept. 15, 1900) in 16
DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPÄISCHEN KABINETTE, 1871–1914: SAMMLUNG DER
DIPLOMATISCHEN AKTEN DES AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTES – DIE CHINAWIRREN UND DIE
MÄCHTE 1900–1902 (Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and
Friedrich Thimme eds., 1924). See also Communique from Maximilian von Brandt
to Lo Feng-luh (Sept. 22, 1900), in 4 THE HOLSTEIN PAPERS 205 (Norman Rich & M.
H. Fisher eds., 1963) (urging the Chinese representative in Germany to hand over
“those persons who are to blame for the murder of Baron von Ketteler and so
many missionaries and the attack upon the foreign legations”).
79 No. 258, Il Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, All’Ambasciatore a Berlino, Lnaza (September 19, 1900), in Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, I Documento Diplomatici Italiani, Vol. IV (Instituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1992) (Brockman-Hawe
trans.).
80 NA, FO 405/96, No. 49 Mr. C Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 27,
1900). See also the Imperial German chargé d’affaires to the Secretary of State (Sept. 18,
1900) and Acting Secretary Hill to the Imperial German chargé d’affaires (Sept. 21,
1900), in Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress, December 3, 1900.
Washington, D.C., (1902) [hereinafter FOREIGN
RELATIONS 1900], also available in NARA, RG 84/217. The American objection
was also rooted in notions of complementarity: “[it is] only just to China that she
should be afforded in the first instance an opportunity to do this [punish their
own], and thus rehabilitate herself before the world”. Id. Russian Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorff privately expressed a preference for exile over executions, or
at least executions by the Chinese as opposed to foreign governments, given their
“special aptitude for such a task.” NA, FO 405/95, No. 192 Mr. C. Hardinge to the
Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 20, 1900). The Japanese agreed that punishment of
“real instigators” should take place prior to a formal renewal of diplomatic relations with the Chinese court, but considered the German insistence on delivery to
be fraught with practical difficulties. Nr. 12458, ‘Grossbritannien – Der Gesandte
in Japan an den Minister des Auswartigen. Die japan. Regierung uber den
deutschen Vorschlag’ (September 22, 1900) in 64–65 DAS STAATSARCHIV:
SAMMLUNG DER OFFIZIELLEN AKTENSTÜCKE ZUR GESCHICHTE DER GEGENWART 276
(1902). See also NA, FO 46/528. No. 165, Whitehead to Marquess of Salisbury (Sept.
22, 1900) (reporting that Japanese Foreign Minister Viscount Aoki explained that
the German proposal would lead to military operations of indefinite duration and
of a greater scale than originally contemplated).
Many periodicals regarded the US position as shortsighted and foolish, but
the editors of The Eastern World (Yokohama) took things a step further and concluded that it was incorrect as a matter of international law. A Question of International Law, THE EASTERN WORLD, Sept. 29, 1900, at 4 (asserting that the U.S. position would invalidate extradition treaties and ran counter to judicial practice).
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British resisted as a matter of pragmatism (the plan was a “counsel
of perfection” insofar as neither the Empress nor the most wanted
Prince Tuan could “be expected voluntarily to sign their own death
warrants, or those of their colleagues and supporters, though some
among them may be ready to sacrifice the rest to the wolves in order to facilitate their escape”; “[n]or does there seem to be any
practicable way to seize the guilty parties, if their surrender is refused”—punishing the Empress Dowager “would involve the destruction of all government in China”), perception (“[a]n adequate
punishment of the Dowager-Empress would, from her sex, be repulsive to European feelings”), and politics (“Germany may have
the view of forcing on a logical casus belli [i.e., disruption of local
governance] . . . [and] we may feel quite confident that the operations would be guided far more by the desire for material advantages, than the pious duty of bringing criminals to justice”).81
Britain’s Director of Military Intelligence in the War Office, Major-General Sir John Charles Ardagh, proposed the establishment
of an international “judicial commission to enquire and report upon charges which may be brought against instigators and perpetrators of outrages; and to cooperate in procuring their surrender[,]
The article is also noteworthy for its articulation, a century before its inclusion in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, of what today is known as
the “unable or unwilling” test: “[Crimes committed against a foreign minister
should be amenable to foreign law] when the government of the criminal . . . is
unable, or shows itself unwilling, to bring them to trial and punish them, as is the
case in China.”). Id.
81 NA, PRO 30/40/22/4, Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China (Sept. 30,
1900). See also PRO 30/40/14, Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China: Advisability of Occupying Pei-Tang, Tongshan, Ching-wang-tao, and Shan-hai-kuan; and
General Observations, (Sept. 22, 1900) (arguing that Germany’s proposed retribution was “much to be desired,” but questioning how China’s officials were “to be
induced to put their heads into the noose?” He concluded that “[w]e shall for the
present have to content ourselves with such reparations as may be afforded by a
pecuniary solatium.”); NA, FO 405/95, No. 208 Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C MacDonald (Sept. 25, 1900) (inquiring whether those guilty of attacks on the legation
and “other recent outrages” could be identified and “seize[d]”); NA, FO 405/95,
No. 212 The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir. L. Lascelles (Sept. 25, 1900) (discussing the
sequencing of punishments and the commencement of negotiations); NA,
FO 405/95, No. 238 Sir C MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 29, 1900)
(arguing that certain responsible parties could be identified, but skeptical that the
guilty, Prince Tuan in particular, could be obtained); HOLSTEIN PAPERS, supra note
78, at 749, Paul von Hatzfeldt to Holstein (Sept. 26, 1900) (“[Salisbury] thinks that we
would be perfectly satisfied if the Chinese turned down our demand for extradition, giving rise to new difficulties and the prolongation of the state of war, so that
Waldersee . . . would still find a situation favourable to military actions and the
opportunity for military and political successes.”)
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apprehension[,] trial and punishment” in the event “of the Chinese
Government declining or neglecting to punish the guilty, proprio
motu.”82 The German government floated a similar idea in the
semi-official Kolnische-Zeitung, putting forward the idea of an “international tribunal” to determine guilt based on accusations
brought by foreign ministers in Peking.83
The idea of internationalized proceedings was not taken up by
the negotiators in Peking, but the Germans ultimately dropped
their insistence on extradition or international trials and agreed to
jointly demand with the other Powers that China itself impose “the
severest punishment” on Imperial officials believed to be involved
in the attacks on the foreign legations in Peking, as well as the
murder and torture of missionaries throughout northern China, “in
proportion to their crimes.” In the Joint Note subsequently drafted
by the Powers and addressed to the Chinese, these attacks were
described as “crimes unprecedented in human history—crimes
against the law of nations, against the laws of humanity, and

Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China (Sept. 30, 1900), supra note 81.
The position of the German government was that although this idea was
“out of the ordinary,” China should not be permitted to hide behind a “formality”
of international law. Documento Diplomatici Italiani, supra note 79, at No. 278,
L’Ambasciatore A Berlino, Lanza, Al Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta.
Perhaps Ardagh and the German government were inspired by the establishment, a mere two years previously, of a series of international tribunals at
Crete to try individuals accused of participating in or inciting mass inter-ethnic
violence. See R. John Pritchard, International Humanitarian Intervention and Establishment of an International Jurisdiction Over Crimes Against Humanity: The National
and International Military Trials in Crete in 1898, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS 1–87 (John Carey, William V. Dunlap, R.
John Pritchard, eds., 2003) (discussing the formation of domestic and international
criminal jurisdictions to try Cretans accused of what today would be considered
war crimes and crimes against humanity) . News reports and official documents
suggest that comparisons between the two operations were obvious and commonplace, and that General Gaselee was aware of the Crete precedent in a general
sense. See NA, ADM 116/118, Case XIII Importation of Arms into China (discussing the Allied experience with blockade in Crete); NA, FO 17/1471, Gaselee to Satow (Mar. 1901) quoted in No. 106, Satow to Lansdowne (Mar. 16, 1901) (“There was
no Commander-in-Chief in Crete and yet order was restored in that island. Our
experiences of a Commander-in-Chief [Waldersee] have hardly been happy.”).
Certainly, Ardagh drew comparisons between the two occupations when the need
arose. Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh (Sept. 22, 1900), supra note 81 (suggesting
that the occupation of Chili province should be organized on the principle of one
nationality per district “as was successfully done in Crete,” as collective occupations afforded opportunities “for plunder, extortion, massacre and wanton destruction, for which no one can be brought to account”). See also Our London Letter, THE MERCURY, Dec. 15, 1900, at 4 (comparing the Crete and China expeditions).
82

83
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against civilization.”84 The Chinese agreed to the condition, and
over the course of the following year nearly one hundred Imperial
officials were executed, punished, or downgraded at the hands of
their own government for their role in the anti-Western uprising.85
Allied invocations of international law in the Joint Note gained
an added dimension during the implementation phase. On two
occasions the Chinese government, when presented with a demand by foreign plenipotentiaries that some particular punishment be doled out, responded that the request was incompatible
with Chinese law. Both times the Allies responded that the responsibility of the identified Chinese official was clear under international law.86
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at Inclosure, Dispatch 482Translation in No. 482 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay (using this phrase to describe the
murder of the Japanese and German foreign ministers, desecration of foreign
cemeteries in Peking, the siege of the foreign legations and incidents “in several
provinces [where] foreigners were murdered, tortured, or attacked by Boxers and
regular troops.”). See also CHINA NO. 6, supra note 17, at No. 233 Sir E. Satow to the
Marquess of Lansdowne, Inclosure 2 M. de Cologan to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries (describing a joint communique of the foreign ministers to the Chinese government
declaring twelve Chinese thought to be involved in the attacks on foreign officials
guilty of “abominable violations of international law”); No. 531, Bülow to von
Hatzfeldt (Nov. 30, 1900) in DIE GROSSE POLITIK, supra note 78 (“Honor and conduct
. . . would be evenly damaged if the East Asian world would reach the conviction
that even in case of the most heinous violations of international law the main instigators get off easily”).
85 The Allied delegates were active in gathering evidence against high and
low level Qing officials responsible for the violence against their co-nationals. On
April 1, 1901 a list of ninety-six individuals with expected punishments was presented to the Chinese. In its response the Chinese court raised legal defenses with
the foreign Plenipotentiaries or shared with them the exculpatory results of its
own investigations in the expectation that new information might lead to exoneration or mitigation. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 107 Mr. Rockhill to
Mr. Hay, Inclosures No. 1 – No.11. See also NA, FO 405/105, No. 14 Sir E. Satow to
the Marquess of Lansdowne (Feb. 6, 1901); NA, FO 405/107, No. 64 Sir E. Satow to the
Marquess of Lansdowne (Apr. 24, 1901).
86 In May 1901, the Chinese pointed out that the punishments demanded by
the foreign Plenipotentiaries exceeded those available under Chinese law. “The
foreign representatives, in asking punishment of Chinese officials,” the Chinese
optimistically wrote, “naturally can not [sic] desire that it should be in violation of
the statutes of China.” FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 107 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 9a. The Allies were disinclined toward leniency and noted that their “preoccupation has been to repress with moderation and justice
crimes against the law of nations, against the laws of humanity, and against civilization, crimes which, being without precedent, had not been foreseen by Chinese
law.” Id. at No. 107 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 11. A similar objection had
been raised (with identical results) in February 1901 about the requested punishment of two high ranking court officials. NA, FO 405/105, supra note 85, at No. 14
Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne (Feb. 6, 1901) (responding to an objection
84
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The Commissioners were never as explicit as the foreign plenipotentiaries in Peking about the nature of the law the Chinese were
believed to have violated, though two aspects of the Commission’s
design and operation suggest that Ting Yung and his cohorts were
perceived as having run afoul of the crimina juris gentium. First, the
Commission counted among its participants officers from states
whose nationals had not suffered harm at Paoting-Fu (Germany,
France, Italy), suggesting that General Gaselee and his
sub-commanders intended to express exceptional opprobrium on
behalf of a community of ‘civilized’ states. Second, the Commission went beyond investigating and punishing crimes against
Western nationals. Colonel Garioni, commander of the Italian
forces in China, described the Commission as also tasked with
punishing the murderers of Chinese Christians who should otherwise have been beyond the jurisdiction and protection of any foreign power.87 A letter home drafted by Commissioner Poole corroborates this understanding of the Commission’s mandate and
operation; Poole spoke of his job investigating “the massacres and
outrages on missionaries and Christians.”88 Moreover, although
the Session Records generally (and ambiguously) referred only to
murdered “Christians” (without regard for nationality), the procèsverbal of the seventh session confirms that crimes against Chinese
converts were within the Commission’s remit.89 By assuming the
power to investigate and punish crimes against Chinese Christians,
conduct that was purely ‘internal’ to their state of nationality, the
Commission exercised what we would call today universal jurisdiction.90
that Ying Nien and Duke Lan should be held accountable as accessories, not principals, as a matter of Chinese law: “I answered that the offences committed were
not against Chinese law, but against the law of nations and of humanity. Chinese
law could not be taken into consideration.”).
87 AUSSME, E-3, Rac 55, fol 30/4 La Spedizione Di Paoting-Fu. Il Combattimento
Di Cu-Nan-Shien. See also JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (speaking of punishing those “responsible for the massacres” without distinguishing between victims of various nationalities).
88 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, Outside the Walls of Paoting-Fu (Oct. 25, 1900).
89
See Annex 1, Seventh Session (declaring that the “military authority will
act against all the people that will be thought to be guilty of having participated in
the massacres against Europeans and Christians.”). See also MÜLLER, supra note 51
(describing the “verdict” announcing Ting Yung’s responsibility for massacre of
Chinese and Western Christians).
90
According to Ku Hong-Ming, a European-educated Chinese high court
official, the punishments at Paoting-Fu were justifiable as a legitimate exercise of a
right of reprisal under the laws of war, as “certain Agents of the Imperial Gov-
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Of course the twenty-first century historian or lawyer will no
doubt pick up on the limits of these legal justifications. One may
quibble, for example, over whether the law of occupation was applicable at all to the Paoting-Fu sortie.91 The traditional understanding, as reflected both in the British Manual and Hague II, was
that the existence of a state of occupation, with all of the attendant
rights and responsibilities that implied, was predicated on the existence of an inter-state war, and the circumstances in China at the
time the expedition was launched were ambiguous enough that it
is not clear whether this prerequisite was satisfied as of October
1900. At the time of the Commission’s sitting, no declaration of
war had been addressed by China to the foreign powers,92 and the
Chinese plenipotentiary and new viceroy of Chili province, Li
Hung-Chang, had not only disavowed the actions of the Boxers,
but when informed that the Powers intended to mount an expedition to Paoting-Fu, had instructed the provincial officials under his
authority to cooperate with the foreigners and imperial troops in
the area and not to oppose the advance.93 The law of diplomatic
protection was also limited, as it only allowed the Allies to reach
cases involving their own nationals. Nascent notions of international criminal law might fill some of these jurisdictional and substantive gaps, but the law was in such an embryonic state in 1900
ernment were believed to have been guilty of acts outraging the laws of nations.”
Latter-Day Notes on the Chinese Question, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Aug. 24, 1901, at 20
(text partially corrected by Author in issue of Sept. 21, 1901, at page 13).
91 See Taillefer, supra note 71, at 241–43 (showing that in the question of
whether Courts established by an occupying power could “reach back” and hear
cases involving acts predating occupation, the French courts, repeatedly affirmed
this power when confronted with the question).
92
The Empress Dowager’s June 21, 1900 “declaration of war” was not sent
directly to foreign ministers and was ignored by many provincial officials, suggesting that the Empress lacked the capacity to speak as the “single voice” of her
country on this issue. See Esherick, supra note 7, at 302–03 (detailing the circumstances leading up to and the impact of the Qing “declaration of war”); Immanual
C. Y. Hsu, Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866–1905, in 11 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF CHINA, 123–24 (John K. Fairbank & Kwang-Ching Liu eds., 1980) (describing
the internal conflict within the Qing government prior to and immediately after
the issuance of the declaration of war). For more on the competing framings of
the conflict as a war or intervention, see FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND
PEACE–A STUDY IN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 64–79 (1949); URS MATTHIAS
ZACHMAN, CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE LATE MEIJI PERIOD 132–36 (2009) (describing
the ambiguous way in which the Boxer expedition and China’s “declaration of
war” were perceived by the Japanese public).
93 CHINA NO. 5, supra note 16, at No. 80 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of
Salisbury.
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that its application should have forced questions as to whether the
legal elements of a late nineteenth century notion of crimes against
humanity could even be identified, and whether a trial at PaotingFu would have violated a norm against retroactivity in the application of international law.
These, however, are not matters that would have troubled the
commanders at Paoting-Fu, who likely would have considered international law through the lens of prevailing Western ideology,
the mission civilisatrice.94 China, as a decadent, cruel, backward and
violent state, was not entitled to the benefits of membership in the
civilized community of nations, including the full panoply of legal
niceties extended to ‘civilized’ powers.95 The point was made
forcefully by international lawyer George Jellinek in an article appearing in the influential American Law Review:
International law in war owes its greatest development to
the last decades; it means, in many points, a substantial
progress in the consciousness of right of the most civilized
nations. China surely has not taken part in this progress. . .
. A government which causes its high officials to be beheaded without any legal proceeding, and which can order
successfully the massacre of innumerable subjects, is not
94 See LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 33–34 (1905) (stating that China is “for some parts within the circle of the Family of Nations, [but it]
remain[s] for other parts outside.”). See also WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (4th ed. 1895) (“Tacitly, and by inference from a series
of acts, states in the position of China may in the long run be brought within the
realm of law; but it would be unfair and impossible to assume, inferentially, acceptance of law as a whole from isolated acts or even from frequently repeated
acts of a certain kind.”). THOMAS HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128–29
(1898) (“[The Chinese] have shown themselves to be well versed in the ceremonial
of embassy and the conduct of diplomacy. To a respect for the laws of war they
have not yet attained.”). For more on the “standard of civilization” see generally
GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
(1984).
95 Nowhere is racial and cultural animus more apparent than in the reports of
Field-Marshal Waldersee, who in the very same missive in which he informed the
Kaiser of his approval of the Paoting-Fu expedition, contended that “one can only
command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application.”
Sabine Dabringhaus, An Army on Vacation? The German War in China, 1900–1901, in
ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR: THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES, 1871–1914
469 (Manfred F. Boemeke et al., eds., 1999). Hull and Hevia both attributed the
pervasiveness of Allied excesses throughout the Boxer conflict to racial attitudes.
Id. at 463–72. See also Hevia, supra note 6, at 186–314 (framing Western imperial
campaigns in China as being partially motivated by a desire to “civilize” the “barbaric” Chinese); Hull, supra note 71, at 135–36, 148–52.
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able to inculcate into its troops respect for the life and
property of its enemy. Those that have been used to massacre their own countrymen can hardly understand that
they should spare prisoners of war. . . . [But] [h]umanity
should be exercised, not because China can demand it as a
right, but because it keeps the nations, who feel themselves
the upholders of civilization, from sullying themselves before the judgment of history.96
The attitude that humanity should be exercised, but was not
required to be, partially explains why widespread looting, rapes
and massacres perpetrated by foreign troops in China were sanctioned at the highest levels of many Allied commands, despite the
obligation memorialized in the Preamble to the Hague Convention
to uphold a minimum standard of conduct even when fighting an
uncivilized power.97 The officers of the Paoting-Fu expedition,
even those who may have deplored the us/them divide that persisted and taken steps to incorporate notions of a common humanity into warfare, were still operating as the representatives of societies whose relations with China had been steeped in the logic of the
civilizing mission for a century, and whose citizens had been
slaughtered in horrific circumstances. Under these conditions, any
benefit of the doubt that in other circumstances might cut in favor
of an accused, or misgiving that their International Commission
had exceeded the letter or spirit of the law, would have been resolved in favor of Allied caprice.
Their imperialist heritage would have shaped the Commissioners’ attitudes towards international courts. Over a century of colonial policies had introduced into the Western intellectual portmanteau the idea of legal spaces geographically within, but spatiolegally divorced from, the territory on which they sat—the socalled ‘Mixed Courts.’ Consistent with their treatment of other
semi-civilised states, over the course of the nineteenth century European nations and the United States had impelled the Chinese
government to grant extraterritorial privileges excepting foreigners
from Chinese law and entitling them to have their cases heard before judges from their own country or by jointly administered tri96 George Jellinek, China and International Law, 35 AM. L. REV. 56, 60-62 (Pauline Adelaide Thompson trans.) (1901).
97 See generally Dabringhaus, supra note 95; Hevia, supra note 6, at 198–240.
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bunals.98 The longstanding acceptance by all but the Chinese of
these institutions primed officers at Paoting-Fu, as well as the wider community of foreigners, to endorse the turn to exceptional internationalized punishment in China without concern for its potential legal deficiencies.
3.2. Prudential Considerations
The bivalent imperatives of culture and law may explain why
the Commission was perceived to be a legitimate vehicle for allocating punishment. But to appreciate why the turn to an international institution was prudent, it will be helpful to understand just
how polarized the nineteenth-century public was over the question
of the appropriate role and degree of collective punishment.99
In October 1900, many of the loudest voices in China were
those demanding a “total war.” The massacre at Paoting-Fu had
heightened emotions, and the possibility of striking a decisive
blow on a city regarded as one of the “main roots” of the uprising
concentrated sentiments of revenge.100 The Pekin and Tientsin Times
proposed reducing Paoting-Fu to ashes, and summarily removing
the heads of those local officials against whom “any” evidence existed, every captured member of the “late [Imperial] Government,”
and any local found to be in possession of arms.101 Reverend D. Z.
98 See generally THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE
SHANGHAI MIXED COURT, 1911–27 (1992). See also DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL
TREATIES—NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 9–35 (2005) (examining the legal basis of
the Unequal Treaties imposed on China by the Western Powers).
99 The 1899 Hague Conventions marked a turning point in the erosion of the
traditional rule that an entire population could be penalized merely by virtue of
their association with an enemy state, in favor of a new expectation that, regardless of the standard of civilization of the enemy, “[n]o general penalty, pecuniary
or otherwise, can be inflicted on [a] population on account of the acts of individuals for which it can not [sic] be regarded as collectively responsible.” HAGUE
CONVENTION, supra note 69, at Art. 50. State practice and some segments of the
reading public, at least, were slow to catch up with the change.
100 Mr. C. F. Gammon, Tientsin agent of the American Bible Society, to Dr. Hykes of
the same Society (Aug. 25, 1900), reprinted in THE BOXER RISING: A HISTORY OF THE
BOXER TROUBLE IN CHINA 83 (1900) (“[I]t is to be hoped that some detachment of
the allied troop may be sent to punish the people of [Paoting-Fu], especially as it is
reported that three of four foreigners are hiding in that vicinity. [None of us asks]
for revenge, but, as a home paper puts it, for justice. It is right and proper to punish crime, and Pao Ting Fu has fed one of the main roots of the growth of the uprising.”).
101 What We Should Do, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Sept. 22, 1900, at 78. W.
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Sheffield, a high-profile American Board missionary with thirty-six
years of missionary service in China under his belt, argued in favor
of “such a chastisement that neither officers nor people throughout
China would dare again to commit or allow such acts of cruel barbarity.”102 News of the Christian deaths at Paoting-Fu provoked
equally extreme reactions among certain members of the diplomatic community. John Fowler, U.S. consul at Cheefo, for example,
opined in his communiques to David Hill, Assistant Secretary of
State, that “if this massacre is true, then it will be the duty of our
Government to raze that City to the ground.”103
Underlying these exhortations was the assumption that it was
only through the crucible of punishment that the Chinese character
could be forged into something capable of exercising the hindsight
and foresight that are the staples of good government and the predicted cycle of revenge killings could be interrupted. From the
private correspondence of Rev. Sheffield: “the punishment of
princes and high officials who took a leading part in the bringing
on this calamity serves to emphasize the magnitude of the crime
against humanity, and to break the power of the part that opposes
reform. . . . Without restitution and punishment such people are
certain to follow up their wrongs, and if law does not reach offenders they will reach them in secret ways that will entail indefinite
bitterness upon innocent and guilty.”104 Similar sentiments could
A. P. MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING: CHINA AGAINST THE WORLD 139–40 (1900) (suggesting levelling the city and salting the Earth).
102
ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 291, No. 210 Correspondence – China’s Punishment
China’s Salvation (printed in the BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT of Oct. 1900) (Paoting-Fu, and other Chinese cities, had “outraged the laws of civilization by their
crimes”). See also Id. at No. 124, Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It does not appear
to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a punitive expedition
should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enormities against the nations have been committed.”).
103 NARA, RG 59/M102/R6, No. 335 Fowler to Hill (Sept. 5, 1900).
104 ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 16, Sheffield to Smith (Feb. 26, 1901). See also
ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 17, Sheffield to Smith (Mar. 26, 1901) (“Government
has been trampled underfoot and it can only recover itself by asserting its power.
It is not ‘bloodthirstiness’ in missionaries to desire to see further shedding of
blood, but an understanding of Chinese character and conditions, and a realization that the policy of general forgiveness means the loss of many valuable native
and foreign lives.”); ABCFM Unit 3 Reel 296, No. 282, Peck to Smith (Mar. 14, 1901)
(“The duty of the avenger of blood is as dominant in Christian ethics it would
seem as among the Hebrews, at least for the murder of parents, and some of our
Christians who had had parents killed by the Boxers can hardly feel that they are
doing their duty when they do not seek a life for a life.”); Unit 3, Reel 300, No. 18,
Tewksbury to Smith (May 6, 1901) (attributing a revenge killing on the part of a local Christian to delays and inadequacies in Chinese justice.); ABCFM Unit 3, Reel
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be found among Allied troops. In James Wilson’s Under the Old
Flag, the author recounted how a British officer, General Barrow,
operating under his command requested permission to blow up a
pagoda. When Wilson questioned the rationale for its destruction
Barrow replied that “if the Christians did not destroy this famous
Chinese temple, the Chinese, who had destroyed many missionary
churches, would conclude that their gods to whom the Pagoda was
dedicated were more powerful than the God of the Christians.”105
The semi-official German report of the Paoting-Fu expedition likewise editorialized that the Chinese “want to feel power and bow
only to the feet on the ground [i.e., to those who project power in a
strong and unwavering manner].”106
For this portion of the population, the logic of symbolic and
psychological warfare was simply too compelling to deny. Mercy
would be perceived as weakness, destruction as strength. The
Chinese psyche had to be crushed through holocaust. But their
voices were counterbalanced by individuals like journalist Thomas
Millard, for whom “the spectacle of a Chinese baby torn from its
dead mother and bayoneted or thrown to drown in a river, is as
pathetic as if that child were white” and the Japan Weekly Mail,
which in grand humanist tradition questioned “what was Paoting’s
share in that atrocity? Was it not perpetrated by the Boxers with
the consent—implied if not express—of the local officials? We
have never heard that the citizens of Paoting were responsible for
it, and surely to destroy the city for such a reason would be a hideous outrage.”107
300, Letter of Tewksbury (Jan. 23, 1901) in No. 10, Tewksbury to Smith (Feb. 18, 1901)
(“Forgiveness of crime–moral suasion–demands an educated intelligence to understand, and this does not exist plentifully among the heathen natives here! Leniency, forgiveness, are called cowardice, lack of care for our church members,
etc. etc.”); North China Mission, THE MISSIONARY HERALD 160, 161 (Apr. 1901) (reproducing a letter from Dr. Ament of Dec. 27, 1900: “[W]e have learned by long
experience that the Chinese learn slowly and time is a large element in their education. Softness, such as our soldiers have manifested on some of their tours, is
mistaken for weakness, and the lesson has to be taught in a more vigorous fashion, however disagreeable it may be.”).
105 JAMES WILSON, 2 UNDER THE OLD FLAG 530 (1912).
106
DEUTSCHLAND IN CHINA—1900–1901—BEARBEITET VON TEILNEHMERN AN
DER
EXPEDITION
163
(1902)
available
at
http://dfgviewer.de/show/?tx_dlf%5Bid%5D=http%3A%2F%2Fapi.deutsche-digitalebibliothek.de%2Fitems%2F37UASR7BFBLZSBMOCAA3TBD3YKSBP57F%2Fsource&tx
_dlf%5Bpage%5D=119&tx_dlf%5Bdouble%5D=0&cHash=1a17cd9d9379381b390f2
af33d62aba3 (Brockman-Hawe trans.) [hereinafter: GERMANY IN CHINA].
107 The Expedition to Paoting, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Oct. 20, 1900, at 406. See also
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There is some evidence that Gaselee was sympathetic to the
views of those urging restraint. According to the semi-official
Germany in China, the General, upon arriving at Paoting-Fu, was
initially disinclined to occupy the city, and would have preferred
to take possession only of the outer gates, as he considered this the
best way to guard against depredations by Allied troops. It was
only at the insistence of German General von Gayl, who reminded
him that the Field marshal had intended that the Allied force subjugate the entire city, that he ordered the occupation to proceed.108
With this in mind, the launch of an International Commission looks like an inspired attempt at resolving the tensions between those who wished to see the Chinese treated with respect
and those who perceived the country as a barbarous backwater deserving of whatever atrocities the Allies doled out. A Commission,
the thinking may have gone, simply by visibly “doing something,”
might channel the impulse towards collective punishment away
from looting, rape and murder, and towards symbolic (and less severe) forms of retribution, like fines and destruction of cultural
How China Should be Dealt With, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Jan. 26, 1901, at 11 (reprinting the suggestions of the Peking and Tientsin Times of Sept. 22, 1900, noting that a
“leading English periodical” supported these propositions, and commenting that
the bloodthirstiness on display was excessive.); Millard, supra note 15, at 194
(“Events such as the months of September, October and November brought to
China have carried war back to the Dark Ages, and will leave a taint in the moral
atmosphere of the world for a generation to come.”).
The same tension between progressives and martial extremists manifested in
other turn-of-the-century conflicts. The 1900’s saw the United States and Great
Britain both engaged in brutal guerilla wars, the former in the Philippines, and the
latter in South Africa. In both the American-Philippine and Anglo-Boer wars,
Western commanders employed policies of “total war,” directing their subordinates to target civilians for torture, imprisonment and death, and collective punishment. And in both cases scathing coverage of these strategies by the news media prompted high-profile courts-martials for these excesses. These trials, which
post-dated the Commission by several years, confirm that some portion of the
public and members of the international community of states had conceded in the
early years of the twentieth century that at least lip service needed to be paid to
the idea that the rules of war applied even to conflicts against the ‘savages’ of the
world and prohibited acts of appalling destruction. See Glenn Anthony May, Was
the Philippine-American War a “Total War”?, in ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR, supra note
95, at 437–59. See also Guénaël Mettraux, US Courts‐Martial and the Armed Conflict
in the Philippines (1899–1902): Their Contribution to National Case Law on War Crimes,
1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 135 (2003) (discussing U.S. court-martial trials during the
American counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines between 1901 and 1902
in the context of their implications on the laws of war); Joseph R. Vergolina, Methods of Barbarism” or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Escalatory Violence as Policy 77 J. MIL. HIST. 1303 (2013).
108 GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at 128.
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property.109 And although it might not have been possible to eliminate collective punishments completely, they could at least be legitimated through their association with an international, and presumptively reasonable, institution. International commissions on
the whole had cultural cachet among those Westerners interested
in humanizing, systematizing and rationalizing punishment by virtue of their inclusion in the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899).110 With respect to individual punishment, trial by International Commission implied that
the accused had received the benefits of, if not the most due process theoretically possible, at least a rational process. In short, by
mediating punishment through an International Commission, the
Allies might be able to legitimize any punishments doled out to
city officials, justify as not unduly harsh or illegal the other “indelible brand[s]” left on the city,111 manifest the sort of decisive and
spectacular action expected of them as Great (and Christian) Powers occupying a semi-civilized country, and otherwise bridge the
gap between their traditional imperial obligations and emerging
ethical imperatives.112

109 For more on looting and Allied crimes, see DAVID SILBEY, THE BOXER
REBELLION AND THE GREAT GAME IN CHINA 214 (2013). See also Dabringhaus, supra
note 95, at 466–67 and James Hevia, Looting and Its Discontents: Moral Discourse and
the Plunder of Beijing, 1900–1901, in THE BOXERS, CHINA, AND THE WORLD 105–06
(2007) for more on press criticism of Allied excesses.
110
Commissions of Inquiry were described by the 1899 Hague Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, according to which Commissions could be called into being by the mutual agreement of disputing states to
elucidate “the facts” and “facilitate a solution of . . . differences.” HAGUE
CONVENTION, supra note 69, at The Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Arts. 9–14.
111 See Smith, supra note 12, at 616. For more on the punitive and retaliatory
impulses of the Allies, see Hevia, supra note 6, at 195–235 (describing the “total
war” practices used by the eight powers in their Chinese expeditions).
112
The British government was sensitive to the criticism from the progressive camp. In early August, 1900, Acting Consul-General Warren cabled Salisbury
with a proposal “that they will be held responsible for any outrage . . . , and further, that their ancestral tombs at Mukden and Peking . . . be utterly destroyed.”
NA, FO 405/94, No. 17 Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury
(Aug. 2, 1900). The return cable was instructive: “The threat to destroy the tombs
of the Manchu dynasty would be very repugnant to public opinion here in Europe, and we are also informed that it would create a bad impression in China
generally.” NA, FO 405/94, No. 29 The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting ConsulGeneral Warren (Aug. 3, 1900).
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4. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO PAOTING-FU TRIAL
The executions attracted significant interest and sparked a
global conversation concerned with the same Great Questions that
bedevil diplomats, politicians, lawyers and academics today: How
should captured enemies be dealt with? Who is an appropriate
target for punishment? Who should determine guilt? Will a judicial reckoning reinforce or undermine peace? What are the goals of
international justice and what sort of institutions accomplish them?
What punishment is appropriate for heinous crimes? Does it matter for sentencing purposes that the perpetrator was swept up in a
mob frenzy? What is the appropriate relationship between forgiveness and unforgivable crimes? How much should the rule of
law be bent in the quest for accountability or truth?
From the Chinese point of view, the Commission and executions were not only incursions on their sovereignty, but an existential threat to the Imperial government.113 By deputizing and relying on local officials to assist with the investigation and carry out
the capital sentences, the Allies had signaled their willingness to
openly convert traditional power-brokers from Chinese to Western
agents. Concerned that such visible incursions on Imperial authority would only encourage domestic challenges to the Qing government, Chinese plenipotentiary Li Hung-Chang, suggested ap113 Li Hung-Chang was “extremely saddened” to hear of the execution, and
privately questioned the Empress Dowager “how [the foreigners] could violate
our sovereignty like this?” Guojia dan an ju Minq Qing dang an guan, 2 Yi he tuan
dan an shi liao 765 (Zhonghua shu ju, 1959). The execution must have made quite
an impression on the minister. At an interview with Barzini in December, after
covering the proposed indemnities, the behavior of the foreign troops, and the
Russian activities in Manchuria, the Li Hung-Chang asks the correspondent “why,
if he [Waldersee], is a kind person, did he behead the mandarins at Pao-ting-fu?”
When Barzini replied that it was a military tribunal that had ordered the decapitations on the grounds that the officials were guilty of the persecution of Europeans,
Li Hung-Chang—no doubt disappointed not to have found a sympathetic ear that
might provide him with some insight into how to avoid a similar outcome in the
future—replied simply “then you have done well to kill them” and quickly
changed the subject. BARZINI, supra note 59, at 331 (Brockman-Hawe trans.). Jung
Lu, a senior minister and confidant of the Empress Dowager, felt that “the death
of these officials should be sufficient for the wrong suffered by the Powers.” Tan,
supra note 77, 140 citing Li Hung-Chang, Li Wen Chung Kung Ch'uan Chi, in
COMPLETE WORKS OF LI HUNG-CHANG (1905), Jung Lu to Shêng, K26/9/24 and
Wuanhuai Sheng, Yü-chʻai tsʻun kao (Wên hai chu pan shê, 1963) 45/23 and 45/26.
There were reports that Shin Sin, the former President of the Board of Rites, committed suicide specifically to avoid the fate of the officials at Paoting-Fu. The Crisis in China, CHRONICLE, Jan. 5, 1901.
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proaching the Allied negotiators with a request that they refrain
from punitive expeditions in the future.114 U.S. minister William
Rockhill was the first diplomat contacted, no doubt because of his
recent and forceful rejection of the German plenipotentiary’s proposal that high level Chinese officials be tried by the Powers. The
Chinese communique framed the request as one that would be in
the Powers’ own interest to grant:
Sir: I have learned that the allied forces at Paoting Fu killed
the provisional treasurer of Chihli, Tung Yung, and others,
in all six men. I have also learned that the foreign soldiers
have gone to various districts, imprisoned and killed various magistrates. Although the reports in the foreign press
say that the treasurer, Ting, had connived at and tolerated
the “Boxers,” nevertheless since August he certainly repented of his past deeds and dispatched soldiers to exterminate the “Boxer” bandits. Further, when the foreign soldiers went to Paoting Fu and the various districts, the
treasurer did not lead his troops against the foreign soldiers, but went outside of the city to receive them and presented them with oxen and wine. It may be said that he
certainly treated them kindly. Nothing was said beforehand that it was the purpose of the foreign forces to kill the
treasurer, and, further, no explanation was made as to the
crime he committed and a request made to China to deal
with him herself. This can only cause foreigners to be treated with contempt, and still further give rise to a feeling of
hatred in the future. It will be difficult for the Chinese officials to open their mouths in having any control in arranging peace, and the will be very much harassed. . . . I ask
you to consult with Mr. Conger and request the United
States Government to use its best endeavors with the foreign powers to prevent them from again using their military power, so that the minds of the people may be set at
rest and avoid further complications . . . .115
Specifically, Li Hung-Chang intended to “try to stop them from taking
action that would damage the peace.” Yi he tuan dan an shi liao, supra note 113, at
765.
115
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 22 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay,
Inclosure No. 1 Viceroy Chang Chih-tung to Mr. Rockhill. An examination of the extensive list of Chinese sources listed in Xiang’s bibliography has not revealed the
114
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Rockhill forwarded the telegram to Washington D.C., but by
way of substantive reply would say only that the U.S. took “no
part whatever” in the Paoting-Fu expedition.116 The matter apexistence of additional documents that might shed light on how the events at Paoting-Fu influenced the subsequent behavior of the Qing government. L ANXIN
XIANG, THE ORIGINS OF THE BOXER WAR: A MULTINATIONAL STUDY 335–36 (2003).
See also PETER FLEMING, THE SIEGE AT PEKING 108 (1959) (providing further evidence
that the Allies’ actions at Paoting-Fu offended the Chinese).
The executions at the provincial capital were also mentioned in a letter by Ku
Hong-Ming, a European-educated Chinese high court official and author of the
well-known anti-imperialist Papers from a Viceroy’s Yamen (1901) in the Japan Weekly Mail. In his letter, Ku argues that the punishment of Chinese subjects was, from
the perspective of international law, a matter exclusively for China, though Paoting-Fu was acknowledged to have been an exception to this rule. In that city,
. . . certain Agents of the Imperial Government were believed to have
been guilty of acts outraging the laws of nations, the Allied Powers were
justified, if they thought fit, to exercise what in modern usage of war, is
called the right of reprisals, i.e., to seize and summarily punish the guilty
Agents. Such a punishment, however, is an act of war: it is not a judicial
punishment. . . .
The execution of the Provincial Treasurer of Paoting-fu would be a legitimate act of reprisal. But the allied Powers gave no warning or notice:
therefore the Chinese looked upon it as an act of bad faith and treachery.
H[is] E[xcelleny’s] the Viceroy Liu’s feelings on the execution at Paotingfu were . . . pity and indignation.
Latter-Day Notes on the Chinese Question, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Aug. 24, 1901, at 20
(text partially corrected in issue of Sept. 21, 1901, at page 13).
116
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 16 Mr. Hill to Mr. Rockhill.
See also NARA, RG 84/763, Rockhill to American Consul, Hankow (Nov. 16, 1900).
Rockhill’s reply, though an exaggeration by the standards of a common-sense definition of ‘participate,’ was consistent with the views of the commander of American forces in China, Major General Chaffee: “The United States troops did not participate in [the Paoting-Fu expedition], it being my opinion that the less the
disturbance of the country by military operations, the sooner would arrive the
opportunity to diplomatically arrange full reparation for all wrongs committed,
and for the further reason that every indication pointed to the utter collapse of organized armed opposition by the Chinese.” ARWD 1901, supra note 10, at 450
(‘Report of Lieut. General Commanding the Army’) (emphasis added). It was
nevertheless a stretch to assert in absolute terms that the U.S. did not participate
in the expedition; Hutcheson had accompanied General Gaselee, suggested the
idea of an International Commission to General, and had undertaken his own investigation into the massacre (the results of which the U.S. diplomatic community
in Peking took a special interest). RG 395/929, Letter from Conger to Hutcheson
(Nov. 7, 1900) (“Am I asking too much in requesting a copy of your Paoting Fu
Report? I would like very much especially to have that portion relating to your
investigation of the murder of our American Missionaries and the trial and sentence of the Chinese officials by the Military Court of the Allies.”). I can find no
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pears to have rested there, as there is nothing in the Italian, British
or German records to suggest that the Chinese ever lodged a formal protest with the Powers officially represented on the Commission.117 Edwin Conger, U.S. Ambassador to China, privately expressed that the convicted “richly deserve the punishment
inflicted” but thought that the means chosen had been counterproductive: “a wiser course would have been to hold the prisoners for
execution by the Chinese authorities, under a peremptory demand
by the powers.”118 James Ragsdale, the U.S. Consul in Tientsin, either harbored his own reservations about the proceedings or was
aware of a general sense of dissatisfaction with the executions,
though he certainly approved of the end result: “Whether the proceedings of the Court Martial is [sic] justifiable or not, at this time,
there can be no question that [the fantai] richly deserves the punishment proposed.”119 Sir E. Satow, British minister in Peking,
called the executions “fitting atonement” and anticipated an “excellent effect.”120 Waldersee similarly reported to the Kaiser that
other instance where the U.S. representative requested a military report from the
China Expedition.
117 Even though a formal protest was never filed, the Chinese objections were
well-known and widely reported. See, e.g., Foreign Politics, THE PIONEER, Dec. 5,
1900, at 2 (“The Celestial authorities . . . are bewildered and indignant that the
Powers should have made him [Ting Yung] a victim, instead of contenting themselves with a few of the helpless coolies whom the soldiers of the German Emperor are slaughtering whole sale with Attila-like barbarity.”); China, JACKSON DAILY
CITIZEN (Jackson, Mich.), Nov. 19, 1900, at 4 (“The state department is reported to
have declined to interfere [with the international court martial], reminding [Minister Wu] that the United States is in China as the equal and associate, not the superior, of the other powers.”).
118 FOREIGN RELATIONS 1900, supra note 80, at No. 451 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay.
119 NARA, RG 84/218, No. 110 James Ragsdale to Conger (Dec. 4, 1900). Ragsdale misidentified the individual “tried by a Court Martial, found guilty and condemned to be executed publicly in Tientsin at an early date” as the Fan-Tai of Paoting-Fu. Ragsdale corrected his error two days later, identifying the prisoner as
“Tan Wen Huan, a Hee pu tao who held the office of Military Intermediary and
was prominent as a Boxer leader.” NARA, RG 84/218, No. 111 Ragsdale to Conger
(Dec. 6, 1900).
120 CHINA NO. 6, supra note 17, at No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury; NA, PRO 30/33/14/11, No. 44, Satow to Admiral (Nov. 8, 1900) (“ . . . the
Paotingfu expedition has returned & 3 leading officials who were convicted of responsibility for murder & ill treatment of foreigners have been executed by Count
Waldersee’s orders […] It will produce an excellent effect.”). Satow recorded in
his diary on November 3, 1900 that he “abstained from interfering” in the execution as it was a “military matter” and he wished to disclaim all official knowledge
of them. He added that it was “quite possible that these executions would produce a good effect.” He later informed the translator for the Chinese plenipotentiary that he had “tried to delay [the] execution, but [the] order had already been
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the expedition had exercised “a moral influence of far-reaching
importance […]”121 though French General Voyron felt that the referral of the decision to the Field-Marshall in Peking had actually
diminished its moral impact.122
Popular opinion of the trial and execution can be gauged from
an examination of contemporaneous press reports. The clear majority of papers either reported a favorable view among Westerners
of the path justice had followed in Paoting-Fu, or editorialized with
their own expressions of approval. The Peking and Tientsin Times
(Tientsin) called the arrest and conviction “the only satisfactory results of the expedition”123 while the Peking correspondent for the
Manchester Guardian (Manchester, GB) reported on the “feeling of
lively satisfaction” at the prospect that the days of “misplaced leniency” were over.124 The Pall Mall Gazette (London) lamented that it
would be some time before the next “sanguinary but salutary crop
of heads is harvested,”125 as the Times (London) predicted that
events would be “received with satisfaction throughout the civilized world” and hoped that the Chinese had “awakened to the
fact that the International Commission are as ready to condemn on
sufficient evidence, and the Powers are as ready summarily to behead, Prince Tuan [a member of the Imperial family and high ranksent.” Either Satow waffled in his support for the execution, or he was lying in an
attempt to turn the situation to the advantage of England. 1 THE DIARIES OF SIR
ERNEST SATOW, BRITISH ENVOY IN PEKING (1900–06) 45, 52–53 (Ian Ruxton ed., 2006),
publishing journals found at NA, PRO 30/33/16/3 and PRO 30/33/16/4.
121
ALFRED, COUNT VON WALDERSEE, A FIELD MARSHAL'S MEMOIRS: FROM THE
DIARY, CORRESPONDENCE AND REMINISCENCES OF ALFRED, COUNT VON WALDERSEE
226 (Frederic Whyte trans., 1924). See also GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at
128, 163 (“The harsh but well-deserved punishment exerted a moral influence in
the whole province . . . The relationship between the Europeans and the citizenry
changed when the sentences were passed with the consent of the Field Marshal
and when he rejected amnesties, especially with regard to the high officials”).
122
SHAT, 11 H 4, folio A.1.1, No. 9, General Voyron to General Bailloud, (November 7, 1900) (writing that in the future, “if new culpable parties are to be tried,
they must be judged on the spot by local military authorities. The transfer of this
affair to Peking has the drawback of lessening the moral effect produced in the
country”).
123
The Return of the Pao-ting-fu Expedition, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Nov.
10, 1900 at 106.
124
China, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 1900, at 6 (“The news of the
sentence pronounced by the International Tribunal in the case of the Pao-Ting Fu
officials has evoked a feeling of lively satisfaction here, as it is that hitherto the
Powers have treated the Chinese officials who were known to be guilty with misplaced leniency.”).
125 Occasional Notes, THE PALL MALL GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 1900, at 2.
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ing Boxer supporter] himself […].”126
In France, Le Temps (Paris) commended the “salutary effect” of
sentencing of the “complicit” local officials on the Chinese government-in-exile—it was reported to have prompted an apology
for the murder of German representative in Peking von Ketteler
the previous June127—and Le Petit Journal lauded the “advantageous” example that had been made and struck terror into the
Chinese of the region.128 Correspondence published in La Civiltà
Cattolica (Rome, Italy), a semi-official organ of the Holy See and a
bellwether for Catholic papers around the world,129 endorsed the
example of “European justice” before a “field military court” as a
solution to the dilemma of how to rouse the Chinese government
to more vigorous repression of the Boxers.130
126 THE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1900, at 9 (“Without the stern punishment, not merely
of the highest local officials who instigated or participated in the Boxer outrages,
but of the highest Imperial officials who devised that patriotic volunteer movement for the murder of foreigners, the insecurity of European residents in China . .
. will certainly continue, and almost certainly increase.”). See also Foreign Politics,
THE PIONEER, supra note 117 (“The most satisfactory feature of the week is the execution, in accordance with the sentence of the International Commission, of three
of the principal local officials responsible for the massacre at Paoting-fu.”); Fitting
the Crimes, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 4, 1900, at 8 (“The allies at Pao-ting-fu have arrested the Governor of the city and other officials for their complicity in the massacres
by the Boxers.”); Our London Letter, THE MERCURY, Dec. 15, 1900 at 5 (“Surely the
Government and officials concerned in such atrocities [European casualties] deserve exemplary punishment. But there is grave reason to fear that the higher
personages connected with these diabolical acts will escape.”); T HE TIMES, Nov. 5,
1900, at 9 (“A beginning has been made at last in the necessary work of punishing
Chinese officials of rank for the atrocious crimes perpetrated at their instigation,
or with their connivance.” Also, attributing expression of “profound regret” at
the death of von Ketteler issued by Imperial edict in October to Paoting-fu, which
“supplied the incentive for its issue.”); China, ST. JAMES GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 1900, at
3 (“It is mere human nature to rejoice that these officials have met with their deserts, and it would seem that for once in a way it is really the guilty officials who
have now been executed”).
127 Affaires De Chine, LE TEMPS, Nov. 6, 1900, at 2. Villetard de Laguerie, correspondent for L’Illustration, sought to present the punishments as a French accomplishment alone. In his article, the trial and punishment are presented as a
boon from the French General Bailloud to the slow-footed British. En Chine,
L’ILLUSTRATION, Jan. 12, 1901, at 22 (describing the inquiry as “serious, solemn,
and adversarial”).
128 Evenenments de Chine, LE PETIT JOURNAL, Jan. 20, 1901, at 5. Le Petit Journal,
like L’Illustration, presented the executions as a strictly French accomplishment.
129 RONALD MODRAS, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ANTISEMITISM 334 (2005).
130 1(10) La Civilta Cattolica 379 (1901) (“If the mandarins are convinced they
have to pay out of their pockets, their person will be imprisoned, and [they may]
even as appropriate [pay] with their lives, oh I can tell you that they will display
the most zealous and solicitous to prevent the [Boxer] movement and to repress
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Westerners outside of Europe and China also generally welcomed the trial and execution. A number of U.S. papers positioned
the executions as a victory; the San Francisco Chronicle printed an
interview with Lieutenant Turner, General Gaselee’s other American aide-de-camp, in which he asserted that the expedition, including the executions and acts of destruction, could not help but have
a strong “moral effect” on the locals.131 Meanwhile, the Jackson City
Patriot (Jackson, Mich.) maintained “[t]hat the murderers of Americans should be punished by German and British officers is evidence that national vindictiveness did not dictate the penalties.”132
In Australia The Age (Melbourne) styled the “court-martial” a triumphant “commencement of the righteous work of doing justice.”133 The Pioneer (Delhi, India) described the punishment as
“the most satisfactory feature of the week.”134 The Japan Weekly
Mail (Tokyo) (initially and with reservation) embraced the trial and
execution as “one of the most satisfactory incidents of the campaign,”135 though later, it deemed the punishment insufficient given the enormity of the crimes, and opined as to where the Commissioners had gone wrong:
[T]hat summary punishment was inflicted upon the three
officials principally responsible must be regarded as a very
lenient administration of justice. It is becoming the fashion
in these latter days to plead mob suggestion as rendering a
crowd immune from responsibility for the acts it perpetrates. There is something to be said on behalf of that theory, and still more on behalf of the undoubted truth that although the resultant of the forces exercised by units of a
mob be savagely murderous, the forces themselves may be
them.”) (Brockman-Hawe trans.).
131 Lesson to the Boxers, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 2, 1900, at 12.
132
China, JACKSON DAILY CITIZEN, Nov. 19, 1900, at 4. Other US papers regarded the trial and punishment as acts of treachery and betrayal based on a misapprehension that the Chinese government had consented to the proceedings in
advance and reserved for itself the right to punish in the event the accused were
found guilty. See e.g., Punishments Too Light, THE TIMES, (Washington, D.C.) Nov.
20, 1900, at 1; MISSOURI VALLEY TIMES (Iowa, USA), Nov. 29, 1900, at 1.
133 The Situation in China, THE AGE, Nov. 26, 1900, at 5.
134 Far Eastern Affairs, The European Outlook, THE PIONEER, Dec.5, 1900, at 2.
135 Notes on Current Events, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 9. The
approval expressed in this issue was preliminary and conditioned on whether
“sufficient evidence of their guilt has been obtained.”
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almost harmless separately. A party of soldiers have been
known to bear a man into a pulp with their belt-buckles,
though each delivered only one blow and that a comparatively light stroke not intended to do serious injury. . . . But
surely neither hypnotism nor the resolution of forces can
apply apologetically to officials who superintend and sanction such performances.136
A few observers gave their imprimatur only begrudgingly.
The correspondent for The Times of India found himself sympathizing with the “difficult position” of the punished, whose tolerance
of crimes against Christians he attributed to their erroneous backing of the wrong horse at a time of national upheaval.137 In Australia, the Evening News (Sydney) approved of the “necessary’”
punishment but predicted that “the next missionary who preaches
the gospel of peace and goodwill at Tientsin will find sceptics
among his audience.”138
A small number of papers questioned the effectiveness of the
executions, and echoed Conger’s anxiety that the beheading of
provincial officials who had handed over the keys to the city without a fight would be perceived as treacherous and ultimately derail
the Peking negotiations.139 Others worried over the potential for
136
Pao-Ting-Fou, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Feb. 9, 1901, at 11. The reaction
serves as a stark lesson in the value of public over private proceedings. The editor’s vitriol was predicated on his (incorrect) understanding that the international
inquiry had confirmed the worst of the rumors—that “young girls had had their
breasts shred off and in that condition had been led through the streets; that
women had been abominably outraged, and that little children had been slung
upon poles, one ankle and one wrist tied together, and in that plight had been carried about the town.” Id. This information was supposedly withheld “lest a
knowledge of them should rouse the allied troops to ungovernable fury.” Id.
Hutcheson specifically disclaimed these rumors in his authoritative report.
Though the missionaries at Paoting-Fu were murdered and humiliated, they were
not tortured in the manner described by the Japan Weekly Mail. HUTCHESON
REPORT, supra note 21, at 465.
137 With the Indian Contingent, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 7, 1900, at 4.
138 China, EVENING NEWS, Jan. 28, 1901, at 4.
139 Mistakes of the Powers in China, THE LITERARY DIGEST, Dec. 1, 1900, at 1 (reprinting and quoting critical articles from the Springfield Republican, the New
York Sun, and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat); Pekin, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN,
Nov. 29, 1900, at 7.
At least two of the West’s ‘old China hands’ agreed that the trial and executions had caused more harm than good. Hosea Morse, 3 T HE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 317 n. 130 (1918) (citing R. Hart, InspectorGeneral of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service, to E. B. Drew, Commis-
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intensified conflict, convinced that the Allies had created martyrs
and that vengeance in their name would follow.140
Outright criticisms of the Commission itself were rare. A German soldier who participated in the punitive expedition spoke of
“faint hearted” Germans back home holding the opinion that the
local officials should have been warned they were not immune
from punishment before the city was occupied.141 The Los Angeles
Herald reprinted an Associated Press telegram deriding the “international court” as a “star chamber” and criticizing the foreign commanders for holding proceedings behind closed doors.142 At one
point the Japan Weekly Mail doubted that a Commission “composed
of foreign officers sitting at Pao-ting and obliged to rely upon such
scraps of testimony as could be obtained from Chinese witnesses
themselves in terror of their lives” could effectively reach the
truth.143 The Japan Weekly Mail also called attention to the hypocrisioner of Customs; “The Paotingfu doings will, I fear, brand us forever with
treachery in Chinese estimation: we got the Prince to order Chinese soldiers out of
the way, and the officials came out and met them in a friendly manner: we then
turned round and tried a lot of the officials, sentenced them, etc., and if report is
true, the next step will be the looting of the city! It is a nasty business altogether.”). See also 2 THE I. G. IN PEKING - LETTERS OF ROBERT HART, CHINESE MARITIME
CUSTOMS, 1868–1907, 1246 (John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, & Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson eds., 1976) (containing Robert Hart, who worked closely
with Li Hung-Chang to negotiate the Boxer Protocol, writing that “[t]hey have executed the Actg. Viceroy Ting Yung at Paotingfoo and occupied (and looted?) the
Imperial Tombs . . . —very appropriate as punitive action, but decidedly impolitic: the first will enrage the whole mandarinate and the second prevent the Emperor’s return—so that order will not be speedily re-established.”). The traveleradventurer James Miller also attributed anti-Western sentiment and delays in the
negotiation of the terms of peace to the fact that foreigners had ordered “[t]he
summary execution of three officials convicted of the murder of the missionaries
at Paoting-Fu by drum-head court-martial.” JAMES MILLER, CHINA, ANCIENT AND
MODERN: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE FROM THE DAWN OF CIVILIZATION TO THE
PRESENT TIME 477–78 (1900).
140 Les Évenements de Chine, LA PETIT PARISIEN, Nov. 7, 1900, at 2. See also Disturbed China, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 24, 1900, at 2 (“The affair…shows the
danger of any attempt on the part of the foreigners to administer justice on their
own account. The Pao-ting execution was intended to strike terror into the hearts
of anti-foreign officials. Apparently its effect has been to rouse a strong antiforeign sentiment among the people.”); Mistakes, supra note 139; Pekin, THE
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 1900, at 7.
141 JUSTUS SCHEIBERT, DER KRIEG IN CHINA, 1900–1901: NEBST BESCHREIBUNG DES
LANDES, SEINER SITTEN UND GEBRÄUCHE 481–82 (1909). According to the German
Army Major, none among the French, German and Italian soldiery regretted this
omission.
142 Marching to Pao Ting Fu, LOS ANGELES HERALD, Dec.13, 1900, at 3.
143 Disturbed China, supra note 140 (“It is not easy to see how a court martial
of foreign officers, sitting in a place just occupied by their troops, could thorough-
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sy of the foreign powers, who had tried provincial officials under
circumstances they would have found offensive had the boot been
on the other foot.144 The atheist, anti-religious, and secular Freethinker (London) likewise pointed to the double standard on display, and questioned the Commission’s (purported) finding, as reported (inaccurately) by the Peking correspondent for the London
Times, that an American woman had had her breasts removed before being forcibly paraded through the town to her death: “we
know that all Asiatics are apt to be cruel, though hardly more so
than American lynchers of Negros. But does any man in his right
senses believe this extravagant story?”145
What of the missionary societies whose members had suffered
at the hands of the Boxers? By and large, the community was
pleased with the actions of the Allies. W.A.P. Martin, for example,
a notable missionary famous for his translation of Henry
Wheaton’s Elements of International Law into Chinese, noted with
some passion in his memoirs that Paoting-Fu, “the scene of unheard-of atrocities,” had been “intentionally subjected to disgrace,”
though he would have preferred to see the city “sown in salt” as
opposed to merely cut off at the knees.146 But amid widespread accusations that their relentless and un-Christian demands for punishment had kept Western sentiment at a boil and exacerbated the
poor circumstances of the Chinese who fell into the hands of Western troops, mentions of Paoting-Fu within the missionary community largely took on a defensive tone.”147 Prominent missionaries
ly investigate candidates and justly judge charges such as those upon which Ting
and his colleagues were presumably arraigned . . . [A] drumhead court martial is
of all tribunals the least fitted to render an impartial judgment”).
144
Disturbed China, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 4 (“Had the
mayor and municipal officials of an American or European city, surrendered the
place peacefully to an American or European army, and had the latter then proceeded to apprehend the mayor and municipal officials, try them by drum-head
court marital and place them before a platoon of musketry, the civilized world
would have raised a cry of indignation”).
Six months after the executions, the Shen Pao (Shanghai News) alluded to new
evidence, Ting Yung’s “published correspondence,” which purportedly cleared
him of “complicity” with the Boxers, and labeled the fantai’s death “a judicial
murder on the part of the too hasty allies.” Notes and Queries, 36 J. OF THE CHINA
BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOC’Y 223 (1905) (reprinting Shen Pao article of 20
Apr. 1901). I’ve found nothing among the archival records that confirms this story.
145 Acid Drops, 20 THE FREETHINKER 710 (Nov. 11, 1900).
146 W. A. P. MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING, CHINA AGAINST THE WORLD 139–40,
165–66 (1900).
147 No less an insightful and influential personage than Mark Twain had attacked
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belonging to the same society as the U.S. victims at Paoting-Fu (the
American Board) devoted significant time, intellectual capital and
ink to justifying themselves.148 Arthur Smith, for example, a veteran American Board missionary in China, called the executions a
“fit penalty” and passionately argued in his memoires that punishment was the only bulwark against repeated acts of barbarity.
For Smith, the punishment of Paoting-Fu’s leadership was precisely the sort of example that needed to be made:
Of all the acts of the military since the capture of Peking,
[the investigation of punishment at Paoting-Fu] is the one
most righteous in itself and most salutary in its result, yet it
has been perversely criticized as a bloodthirsty cry for
“vengeance,” unworthy of Western nations! . . . When it is
remembered what these men have done, and with what
savage brutality many of them have plotted to exterminate
every foreigner in their jurisdiction, it is evident to every
one acquainted with the conditions that in the New China,
that ought to ensue after peace negotiations have been
completed, such officials ought not for a moment to be tolerated. . . . If Western Powers, whether moved by sentimentality or by a desire to trade upon the supposed good
the missionaries for their revengeful zeal with his characteristic sarcasm: “We
have Mr. Ament’s [a prominent missionary in China] impassioned assurance that
the missionaries are not ‘vindictive.’ Let us hope and pray that they will never
become so, but will remain in the almost morbidly fair and just and gentle temper
which is affording so much satisfaction to their brother and champion today.”
Mark Twain, To the Person Sitting in Darkness, 122 N. AM. REV. 161, 165 (1901). See
also LARRY CLINTON THOMPSON, WILLIAM SCOTT AMENT AND THE BOXER REBELLION:
HEROISM, HUBRIS AND THE “IDEAL MISSIONARY” 205–14 (2009) (providing background information on the dispute); WILBUR CHAMBERLIN, ORDERED TO CHINA 59–
60, 129 (1903) (exemplifying the missionaries’ approval of the Allies’ actions: “I
have talked with a number of them and they all insist that the only thing to do in
China is to cut off the head of every mother's son of a Chinaman who had anything to do, directly, with the Boxer movement, or who sympathized with it. Indeed, they are much more emphatic in their demands for blood than was Emperor
William a month ago. . . . [I]t sounds a little strange to hear a disciple of the Messenger of Peace calling for blood so loudly that everybody hears him or her . . . We
are condemned by the missionaries and the citizens because we have been lenient.
They say, ‘Chaffee is chicken-hearted. Why don't he kill a lot of these devils and
teach them a lesson?’ They demand blood, always blood, and they point us to
Germany as an example of what should be done!”).
148 Missionaries on their Defence, 32 THE CHINESE RECORDER AND MISSIONARY
JOURNAL – JULY 1901 TO DECEMBER 1901, 371 (1901) (quoting an editorial from the
North-China Daily News).
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will of the Chinese, to be gained by minimizing the guilt of
the guilty, are to slur over the past and deal weakly with
those who are not only criminals in our eyes but in those of
the Chinese themselves, the inevitable result must be to reawaken in all Chinese officials and people alike a thorough
contempt for Westerners who are so easily hoodwinked.
The Chinese will attribute the result to every motive but the
real one, and will certainly think and feel that Powers who
have held the sword in hand so long, and yet have failed to
employ it as Chinese know that it ought to be employed,
are not to be dreaded in the future; and it is a moral certainty that the Chinese will act in accordance with this view.149
Missionary passions were occasionally justified in secular
terms, as an appropriate expression of a value—justice—deeply
embedded in the fundamental order of social and interstate relations. This leaning towards natural law is apparent, for example,
in Dr. Henry Porter’s private letters:
[With reference to missionary criticisms of the U.S. decision
not to participate in the Paoting-Fu expedition] The American commanders here ask, out of their ignorance; why the
Missionaries are so blood thirsty? There is a sense of justice
in the minds of men which must be met. It is not bloodthirsty to expect and to secure the ignominious death of a
murderer and a brigand. When a Nation undertakes really
to punish another Nation for its bitter crimes there is no
other element, than that of simple justice to be considered.150
149 Smith, supra note 12, 500, 714–15, 726–27. See also The Situation in China, 69
THE CHRISTIAN WORK 1 (Nov. 29, 1900) (“The way to prevent a repetition of the
terrible outbreak in China . . . is to bring the Chinese mind into close touch with
the mills of justice when they grind exceeding fine.”).
150
ABCFM Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 126 Porter to Unknown’ (Oct. 28, 1900). See
also ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124 Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It does not
appear to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a punitive expedition should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enormities against
the nations have been committed.”); MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING, supra note 101,
at 165 (“The punishment of the guilty princes commends itself to our sense of justice.”); Id. at 165–66 (commenting that the punishment of inner-circle officials for
attacks on foreigners in Peking “commends itself to our sense of justice”);
SHANGHAI MERCURY, THE BOXER RISING: A HISTORY OF THE BOXER TROUBLE IN CHINA
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Of course Paoting-Fu was only one specific instance, albeit an
outstanding and highly visible instance, where missionaries had
demanded punitive action in China. The events of October and
November 1900 were ultimately subsumed into broader public and
private discussions concerning the justification and appropriate
role of punishment. On the public side, Gilbert McIntosh, in his
aptly named apologia Is There Anything In It? Some After-Crisis
Vindication, offered a riposte to the claim that calls for the punishment of those who were guilty of massacre had been un-Christian,
refracting international politics through the prism of Christianity to
suggest that punishment was the superior moral and political imperative:
If governments are the ministers of God's righteousness,
then surely it is the duty of every Christian government not
only to uphold the right but to put down the wrong, and
equally the duty of all Christian subjects to support them in
so doing. For China as for Western nations, anarchy is the
only alternative to law. Both justice and mercy require the
judicial punishment of the wrong-doers in the recent outrages.151
Additional justifications were developed through intermissionary correspondence as each sought reassurance that their
conduct was beyond reproach. Punishment was variously framed
as: (1) a practical response to the existence of manifestly dangerous individuals;152 (2) a means of strengthening the hand of the ne83 (1900) (reprinting the letter of Mr. Gammon, Tientsin agent of the American
Bible Society to Dr. Hykes of the same Society (Aug. 25, 1900): “[I]t is to be hoped
that some detachment of the allied troop may be sent to punish the people of that
region [Paoting-Fu], especially as it is reported that three of four foreigners are
hiding in that vicinity. We do not any of us ask for revenge, but, as a home paper
puts it, for justice. It is right and proper to punish crime, and Pao Ting Fu has fed
one of the main roots of the growth of the uprising.”).
151 GILBERT MCINTOSH, IS THERE ANYTHING IN IT?
SOME AFTER-CRISIS
VINDICATIONS 54 (1902).
152 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (July 25, 1901) (“it is not by
promiscuous forgiveness that these conspicuous murderers still with weapons in
hand and prowling the country can be made to order their lives according to law.
If they are not punished for past crimes they will ultimately be punished for later
ones. I am talking about desperate characters, no men for a few months driven by
a wave of excitement into excesses, and now ready to waken out of delirium and
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gotiators in Peking;153 (3) an extension of Christian duty to take a
life for a life, and generally provide for the spiritual needs of native
and foreign Christians;154 (4) better than the amnesty or apathy,
which would foster a perception of the Western powers as “abettor[s] of the Boxers by [their] neglect]”;155 (5) an appropriate psychological response to the traumas experienced by victims of the
Boxers;156 and as (6) the only means of advancing the security of
otherwise disempowered Chinese Christians.157
5. INTELLECTUAL RIPPLES – THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION’S
LEGACY
The Commission, like a number of other nineteenth century
experiments with international criminal justice,158 was cursed by an
inherently short memetic half-life. The brief but vibrant discussion
become good citizens. . . . [T]he country will not be in settled conduction until
several thousands of such men have been punished, or course in different degrees. . . . [W]ith the country filled with desperate characters direct efforts must
be put forth to capture and put beyond power to do further evil, a few leading
names.”).
153 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 126. Porter to Unknown (Oct. 28, 1900);
ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 15 Sheffield to Smith (Dec. 14, 1900); ABCFM Unit 3,
Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (Aug.19, 1900).
154 ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 296, No. 282 Peck to Smith (Mar. 14, 1901); ABCFM
Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 16, Sheffield to Smith (February 26, 1901); ABCFM Unit 3, Reel
297, No. 126 Porter to Unknown (October 28, 1900); ABCFM Unit 3 Reel 298 No. 16
Sheffield to Smith (Feb. 26, 1901) (“‘An eye for an eye’ is the rule of action.”).
155 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 322, Atwood to Smith (May 4, 1901).
156 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 322, Atwood to Smith (Sept. 10, 1901) (“It is not at all
strange that the Christians here harbor feelings of revenge. They can never forget
these awful crimes against their teachers and against humanity.”).
157 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (July 9, 1901).
158
See Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, Constructing Humanity’s Justice: Accountability for ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in the Wake of the Syria Crisis of 1860, 3 HIST.
ORIGINS OF INT'L CRIM. L. (Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling & Yi Ping eds., 2015)
(describing the fleeing effect that the Syria Crisis of 1860 had on international
criminal law); Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, A Supranational Criminal Tribunal for
the Colonial Era: The Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR
CRIMES TRIALS 50–76 (Kevin Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013) (discussing the
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, established to try a single individual for what today
would be considered war crimes); Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Punishing Warmongers for their “Mad and Criminal Projects” – Bismarck’s Proposal for an International Criminal Court to Assign Responsibility for the Franco-Prussian War, 53 TULSA L.
REV (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Bismarck’s 1870 proposal for an international
criminal court to try the “intellectual originators and instigators” of the FrancoPrussian War).
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on matters of international justice sparked by events at Paoting-Fu
was quickly overridden by other events, and there is nothing in the
military and political histories, missionary literature, or the newspapers of the subsequent decades to indicate that the Commission
entered the collective long-term memory.159 The Paoting-Fu experiment cast an equally short shadow over the West’s community of
international law scholars. Luminaries Robert Ruzé,160 Arthur Lorriot,161 and Raymond Robin162 mentioned the Commission in their
respective treatises on occupation law, but only to develop their
theories concerning the extent of a belligerent’s jurisdiction over
local crimes; at no time was the Commission presented in the legal
literature as a nexus point where the law of occupation, the customary international law right of access to justice, and the obligations of criminal repression overlapped. In the absence of broader
framing, no ‘Paoting-Fu myth’ emerged that synthesized, gave a
name to, or otherwise impelled a movement towards the criminali159
The Commission and its work were mentioned in passim in a few works
that have not yet been cited in this paper. These include Lt.-Col. V. Tariel, La
Campagne de Chine (1900–1901) et le Matériel de 75, 59 REVUE D'ARTILLERIE 413, 449–
50 (1901–1902) (noting briefly that a commission of enquiry was established to
look into the causes of the Boxer movement and punish the authors of the massacres in the region, as well as the death of Paoting-Fu notables and the indemnity
imposed on the city); Les Évenements Militaires en Chine (1900–1901)(1) 59 REVUE
MILITAIRE DES ARMÉES ÉTRANGERS – RÉDIGÉE A L'ÉTAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMÉE 256, 262
(Jan.-June 1902) (noting briefly the execution of Chinese officials “judged to be accomplices in the murders of Europeans and native Christians); F REIHERR EUGEN
BINDER VON KRIEGLSTEIN, DIE KÄMPFE DES DEUTSCHEN EXPEDITIONSKORPS IN CHINA
UND IHRE MILITÄRISCHEN LEHREN 53 (1902) (mentioning the commission in passing);
GIEHRL RUDOLF, CHINA FAHRT, ERLEBNISSE UND EINDRÜCKE VON DER EXPEDITION
1900–01 59 (1903) (mentioning the execution of the Feng-tai as well as the destruction of some of Paoting-Fu’s walls and temples); C. C. Manifold, Recent Exploration
and Economic Development in Central and Western China, 23(3) THE GEOGRAPHICAL J.
281, 295 (Secretary of the Royal Geographic Society ed., Mar. 1904) (describing the
international court at Paoting-fu in passing); Smith, supra note 12, at
611(mentioning the recommendations of the Commission regarding beheadings
of officials in the city); MARIO VALLI, GLI AVVENIMENTI IN CINA NEL 1900: E L'AZIONE
DELLA R. MARINA ITALIANA 632–34 (1905) (summarizing the procès-verbal of the
Commission’s proceedings (the document reproduced in this paper as Annex 1)
without citation).
160
Robert Ruzé, La juridiction des armees d'occupation en ce qui concerne leur
proper protection, 16 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: DROIT DES
GENS, HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE, DROIT PÉNAL, DROIT FISCAL, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 134,
148–151 (1909).
161
ARTHUR LORRIOT, DE LA NATURE DE L’OCCUPATION DE GUERRE 339–41
(1903).
162
RAYMOND ROBIN, DES OCCUPATIONS MILITAIRES EN DEHORS DES
OCCUPATIONS DE GUERRE 202–03 (Division of International Law of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace trans., 1942).
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zation of mass violence in humanity’s name.
Though largely consigned to oblivion, there is one occasion
where the Allied experience with international justice carried over
into the new century to influence subsequent political and legal
practice. Interestingly, the Commission in this instance was not
presented as a landmark in the development of international criminal law, but as an anti-precedent that purportedly validated a turn
towards political, as opposed to legal, punishment in the wake of
heinous international ‘crimes.’
At the conclusion of the First World War a new generation of
statesmen and attorneys confronted questions of international
criminal responsibility. While the Allies generally agreed that
Germany had perpetrated war crimes during the war, they were
divided over whether to try German leadership before an international court and whether aggression should form part of the charge
sheet. In late January 1919 the legal advisers to the U.S. delegation
to the Paris Peace Conference, David Miller and James Scott,163
shared with the Allies a memo adopting the position that the trial
of the Kaiser for the crime of engaging in illegal war would be contrary to the prohibition on ex post facto laws, but that international
law permitted the victorious states recourse to “political action”
that would “restrain a disturber of the public peace.” In their
memo, they explained why the efforts of the Allies to secure the
punishment of Boxers and collaborators in the aftermath of the Uprising fell into the category of political action, and was therefore
not a “legal” precedent to the proposed trials of Germans:
[Allied actions] have been treated as an example of political
punishment rather than as a precedent for judicial or legal
punishment, because although the Powers stated that their
action was taken to punish “crimes against the Law of Nations,” no judicial process of any kind appears to have been
invoked to establish the criminal responsibility of the alleged offenders or to determine their punishment. […]
[With respect to the punishment of eleven high level officials in the early stages of the negotiations,] [n]one of the
usual safeguards of ordinary jurisprudence to assure justice
163 David Hunter Miller & James Brown Scott, 1 My Diary at the Conference of
Paris, with Documents 86 (1924) (entry for Jan. 21, 1919) [hereinafter “Miller Diary”].
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to accused persons appear to have been present in this case.
There is no indication that any of the accused were present,
either personally or by counsel, at the meeting of the allied
ministers which decided their fate, or that they were given
any opportunity whatever to defend themselves.
The incident cannot therefore be regarded as a legal precedent for the punishment of crimes against International
Law; it was nothing more than the arbitrary determination
by the political representatives of the Powers who had military control at Peking that certain Chinese officials whose
guilty connection with the Boxer uprising they regarded as
notorious should suffer death.
Of the same character seems to have been the actions of the
allied military expedition at Pao-ting during the same Boxer
disturbances. […] China protested against the violation of
her sovereignty and of the agreement of the Allies that she
should herself punish the guilty parties.164
Miller and Scott concluded that, with respect to trials for war
crimes before an international military tribunal, “the enemy may in
[some] cases find ground for serious objections to the presence of
an officer upon a commission trying crimes not committed against
his army of nationals.” Apprehension of this outcome led them to
recommend “separate tribunals for each nation or each group of
nations whose armies were actually united in campaign.”165
Ultimately, seven of the nine powers participating on the postWar “Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties” overruled U.S. resistance to international trials and its rejection of the “laws of humanity” as a
distinct legal category of international crimes,166 and agreed to rec164 Id. at 474, Document 213, ‘Memorandum Regarding the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and for the Crimes Committed in the War.’
165 Id. at 505–06.
166
Memorandum of Reservations presented by the Representatives of the United
States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, April 4, 1919 and Reservations by the Japanese Delegation, REP. OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REP. OF AMERICAN
AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMM’N OF RESPONSIBILITIES, 64, 74, 80 (1919) (mentioning the American and Japanese Delegations’ reservations: American Delegation: “The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for
no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law”; American Delegation: “The American Representatives felt very strongly that too great attention
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ommend to the Council of Four the formation of a High Tribunal to
try individuals accused of violating international law.167 Nothing
in the negotiation record suggests that the other Entente powers
ever challenged the U.S. position on the punishments inflicted in
China.
What accounts for this quietness? The simplest explanation
might be that by 1919 an effective challenge to the American position was simply impossible to mount, with the relevant documents
either lost or buried and the institutional memories too degraded.
Alternatively, pro-trial Powers might be attributed to anxiety that a
debate necessitating a meticulous historic inquiry into such an obscure entity would unnecessarily delay prosecutions. Moreover, if
the delegates had assumed (correctly, as it turned out) that the
Americans would resist “legal” international trials on principle no
matter how much evidence or pressure was brought to bear,168
could not be devoted to the creation of an international criminal court for the trial
of individuals, for which a precedent is lacking, and which appears to be unknown in the practice of nations.”; Japanese Delegation: “A question may be
raised whether it can be admitted as a principle of the law of nations that a High
Tribunal constituted by belligerents can, after a war is over, try an individual belonging to the opposite side, who may be presumed to be guilty of the laws and
customs of war.”).
167
Id. at 23. The delegates rejected U.S. suggestions that a Commission of
Inquiry be established “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors
of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws
and customs of war committed during its course.” Under the American proposal,
the Commission would have a mandate to “examine the evidence, and to reach a
judgment, and then to present this as a report to the world at large through the
public press in order that the opinion expressed in the report should be examined
or tested by public opinion.” Suffice to say, the proposal was rejected. “A trial
they wanted,” Scott said during a subsequent interview, “and [they] were satisfied with nothing less than a trial.” The Trial of the Kaiser – January 21, 1921, Questions Answered by James Brown Scott, Legal Adviser to American Peace Commission
(Appendix X), in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS – THE STORY OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE, 1918–1919 477–78 (Edward House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921).
168 The United States never was able to coax the other members of the Council of Four out of their plans for a trial of the Kaiser or others accused of war
crimes, though they were ultimately victorious in persuading them to ignore the
Commission’s recommendations and remove any reference to “international law”
in favor of language in the Versailles Treaty to the effect that the Kaiser’s trial
would be for “a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties” and that the trial would be guided by “the highest motives of international policy.” Article 227, Treaty of Versailles. Robert Lansing, American representative and Chairman of the Commission on Responsibility, wrote that
“[m]anifestly the tribunal . . . is not a court of legal justice, but rather an instrument of political power which is to consider the case from the viewpoint of high
policy and to fix the penalty accordingly.” R. Lansing, Some Legal Questions of the
Peace Conference, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 631, 647 (1919). James Scott noted that
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convincing them that Boxer punishments were more legal than political would only have only have diminished the prospects of
achieving even quasi-judicial ‘political’ prosecutions, as these
would now be shown to have been unprecedented. Then again,
the thinking might have been that defending a Commission so intrinsically connected with a war widely criticized for the lack of restraint with which it was fought was a losing strategy for legitimating an international trial intended to cast the Germans as
barbarians and reinforce the civilized status of the Entente powers.
6. THE JUDICIAL CHARACTER OF THE COMMISSION AND FAIRNESS OF
THE TRIAL
Hutcheson’s Report, presumably the only source of information about the punitive expedition available the US negotiators,
exclusively referred to the court as a “Commission of Inquiry” and
“International Commission,” titles evocative of a body limited in
its mandate to determining factual causes and not charged with assigning legal responsibility. Had a more complete record of the
Commission been available to them, perhaps their reasoning
would have taken a different turn. Once the global and public record is taken into account, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the Commission was, in fact, a court of law.
The general understanding, shared by diplomats, the military,
and the foreign population of China, was that the Commission was
fundamentally a judicial body. The full name of the Commission
(as recorded in the Session Records)—“The International Investigative Commission to seek out, judge and punish the principal authors
of the massacres of Christians, and the promoters of the same” –
connotes an institution with the full panoply of powers ascribed to
courts, as well as one that is owed more than mere political deference.169 In his reports home, Colonel Garioni, commander of the
“[b]ecause of [President Wilson’s] refusal [to consent to the Kaiser’s trial for a
criminal offense,] the Supreme Council rejected the majority report of the Commission of Responsibility, and as a compromise agreed upon an article according
to which the Kaiser, if the Allied could get their claws on him, should be arraigned for an offense against international morality. President Wilson thought,
as I believe, that this was the most that could be permitted, and that it would not
be a legal but a political offense that the punishment should not be a criminal but
a political punishment.” WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, supra note 167, at 475.
169 Supra Annex 1, Introduction (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6

2017]

AN EXPERIMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

691

Italian forces in China, discussed the Commission in a way that
suggested that the exercise of investigatory and sentencing powers—the sine qua non of a court – were the raison d'être of the body
from the beginning.170 Moreover, whatever its formal title and
mandate, in practice the Commission received evidence concerning
the responsibility of individuals for crimes, apportioned responsibility
among them, and determined the legal consequences that would follow – inherently judicial tasks.171 Although their findings were
styled “recommendations,” the act of handing these over to supreme commander Waldersee for confirmation, remittance or dismissal paralleled the process of review of courts-martial verdicts
that was a standard part of domestic law.172 Finally, the record is
rife with the use of signifiers – ‘court martial,’ ‘international military tribunal,’ ‘war crimes trial,’ ‘international court,’ ‘international
tribunal’ and ‘military court’ – that connote judicial power and
process.173 Jamieson even described himself as “the delegate of
General Gaselee on a Military Court of Inquiry or court-martial
[…].”174 If anyone at the time questioned the general use or ap170 AUSSME, E-3, Rac 55, fol 30/4 ‘La Spedizione Di Paoting-Fu. Il Combattimento Di Cu-Nan-Shien.’ The semi-official Germany in China referred to the proceedings as “criminal” and the executed Chinese officials as the “convicted.”
GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at 163, 264.
171 A debate over the judicatory nature of various statutory tribunals established by Parliament played out in Britain over the course of the nineteenth century. In 1873, the House of Lords considered the judicial nature of the military
courts of inquiry. Despite their executive origins, limited powers and administrative function, the military courts, which were organized pursuant to the Queen’s
Regulations for the Army (1859), were determined to be “court[s] duly and legally
constituted and recognized in the [A]rticles of [W]ar” for domestic purposes,
based on their having “all the qualities and incidents of a court of justice.” Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255 (Eng.) cited in CHANTAL STEBBINGS, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TRIBUNALS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 302 (2006).
172
3 UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA AND ATLAS 222 (1900); see also Military Law, 15
THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (1891) (indicating that a verdict
of a court martial was reviewed and concurred in by a military commander, similar to the process by which the Commission submitted their recommendations to
Field Marshal Waldersee).
173
The wide variation in nomenclature used to discuss the Commission is
awkward, though unsurprising given the relative secrecy in which the body operated, its distance from the command centers of Tientsin and Peking, and the novelty of the institution.
174 NA, FO 405/102, Inclosure 1 Memorandum of Mr. Jamieson’s Visit to Paoting
in No. 131 Satow to Marquess of Salisbury (sent 14 Nov. 1900, received 21 Jan. 1901)
(un-redacted version of Jamieson Memorandum) (adding “[I act] not by any
means in a civil capacity, inasmuch as the modes of procedure differed toto valo
from those observed in Civil Courts and I have absolutely no locus standi in the
matter as a civilian.”). Elsewhere in the same communication Jamieson referred to
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plicability of these overtly judicatory appellations, I have not uncovered their objections.
Miller and Scott’s accusation of unfairness is more problematic.
It is difficult to determine today what ‘fairness’ meant or even
should have meant in the context of the Paoting-Fu trial.175 Consider, for example, the question of whether the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege existed in 1900. The prohibition on ex post facto laws
was implicit to the German, British, French and Italian Military
Manuals, but only insofar as those manuals dealt with crimes perpetrated by their own citizens. Moreover, those rules had been developed primarily to dissuade soldiers from disobedience and
cowardice with the threat of harsh, quick and decisive punishment.
The Commission, however, existed to hear the case of an atrocity
perpetrated by a quasi-belligerent enemy.176 Given the different
the body as a “Military Commission.” JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17.
Prior to the first sitting of the Commission, Jamieson wrote MacDonald that if
TingYung were guilty a “drumhead court-martial could suffice.” NA, PRO
30/33/7/9, Jamieson to MacDonald (Oct. 20, 1900).
The Intelligence Department’s Official Account used the linga franca of law as
well, stating that Ting-Yung, Quei Heng and Wan Chan Kuei each had their cases…tried before the International Commission” which “sentenced” them to beheading. OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, supra note 56, at 134. Gaselee reported the outcome
of the proceedings to London thusly; “[t]he trial was by International Commission, and the proceedings were confirmed by Count von Waldersee.” C HINA NO.
5, supra note 16, at Inclosure No. 3 General Sir A. Gaselee to Sir E. Satow and the Secretary of State for India; in No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury. Enrico
Morin, Minister of the Italian Navy between 1893 and 1903, described the Commission to Foreign Minister Venosta as an “international military tribunal.” No.
531, Il Ministro Della Marina, Morin, Al Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta
(29 Nov. 1900) supra note 79.
175
There is also a problem in determining whose perceptions of fairness
should be dispositive. Should we reference those of a nineteenth century jurist?
A military officer? A clique of military officers of diverse nationalities?
176 To be sure, by 1900 the prohibition on ex post facto laws and punishments
was a common fixture within regular European criminal justice systems. See 1 M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INT'L CRIM. L. 78–79 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 2008) (citing Guiliano Vassalli, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 8 Nuovo Digesto Italiano 1173 (1939) as the
most comprehensive comparative analysis of the principle nullum crimen sine lege
(no crime without law)). This does not mean that the principle would have applied in contexts where the law of occupation held sway. French military law
permitted the prosecution, even for crimes that did not appear in the Code of Military Justice, of foreigners who threatened the safety of the occupying army. Nicolas, infra note 182, at 33 (Art. 63 (commentary)). Taillefer acknowledges this line
of precedent, but nevertheless claims later that “[…] in French practice, the inhabitants of occupied countries are entitled to justice in accordance with the same
procedure and the same conditions as the soldiers of the French army.” Taillefer,
supra note 71, at 225, 230. The British Manual afforded invaders complete discretion over the law that would apply in occupied territories, and did not even guar-
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context in which these two spheres of justice were operating—in
the international/China context goals to be achieved were of larger
consequence (if not loftier), the passions of local and foreign governments were more roused, and the pressure to secure punishment greater—it would have been far from obvious to the leading
military and legal authorities of the era that principles developed
for application in the domestic military sphere could or should automatically pertain in the international context.177
Attempting to test the Commission a posteriori against some
theoretical ‘ideal’ proceeding for 1900 might be possible, if significant divergences between the relevant national military codes from
this period in the rights they recognized and in their conception of
the circumstances and persons to which those rights would apply
were less extreme. The German Militärstrafgerichtsordnung (1898),
for example, afforded a right to adduce arguments on appeal,
which its British analog did not.178 Likewise, the British Manual of
Military Law (1898) (unsurprisingly, given its common-law roots)
provided extensive procedural protections for the accused in most
cases, incorporating the entire corpus of English evidentiary law
antee locals recourse to a legal process. Commanders were specifically authorized
to punish “in such manner as he thinks expedient, inhabitants guilty of breaking
the rules laid down by him for securing the safety of the army.” MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW, supra note 70, at 297. The German military code mandated the application of German law in occupied territories. See MILITARY PENAL CODE
(MILITAR-STRAFGESETZBUCH) FOR THE GERMAN EMPIRE, supra note 71. The Italian
Codice Penale provided that, in times of war, “persons outside the army that commit or contribute with someone in the army to commit an offense under this Code
will be subject to the same punishments [under this Code].” CODICE PENAL, supra
note 71, at Art. 236. In terms of personal jurisdiction, however, courts-martial
could only hear cases against persons involved with the military, their servants, or
prisoners of war. Id. at Art. 545. In short, it seems that in 1900 the prohibition of
ex post facto laws was not envisioned as extending to natives residing in occupied
territory.
177 See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 87 (1944) (arguing, in 1944, in favor of the development of an international judiciary that “[t]here is no rule of general customary international law forbidding the enactment of norms with retroactive force, so called ex-post facto laws”). See also B. BROOMHALL, COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 713, 735 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2nd ed. 2008) (“By the start of the
First World War, [nullum crimen sine lege] was recognized in the legal systems of
all developed countries and their dependent territories, although not always in
the same way.”).
178 See MILITÄRSTRAFGERICHTSORDNUNG, supra note 71, at Art. 382; MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW, supra note 70 at 66 (pointing out that verdict needed to be confirmed, disconfirmed or revised by officer holding the authority to do so), 153 (indicating that the accused could challenge a court-martial for lack of jurisdiction or
failure to adhere to the rules concerning proper constitution).
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and adopting as a guiding philosophy the principle that “[t]he accused is to be allowed great latitude in making his defense, and
will not, within reasonable limits, be stopped by the court merely
for making irrelevant observations.”179 But the British Manual also
introduced the Field-General Court-Martial, a forum which exempted commanders from applying these and other burdensome
rules when “necessary” and limited defendant’s rights to those
which were “practicable” given the exigencies of the situation.180
Foreigners within the ambit of British military justice were explicitly not guaranteed even these limited protections.181 The French
Code du Justice Militaire (1857, modified 1875) also truncated the notice, case-preparation and appeals rights of defendants as necessity
dictated.182 The Italian Codice Penal went one step further and authorized trials in absentia at the discretion of the military authority.183 The Militärstrafgerichtsordnung, in comparison, set a single
standard for justice that applied to foreigners and occupier alike,
during times even of heightened danger, but (consistent with its
civil-law heritage) provided far fewer rules concerning the admissibility of evidence.184 No indication of a shared concept of ‘essential’ or ‘universal’ procedural rights emerges from these sources.
How then to settle the question of fairness? After setting aside
concerns over anachronism and embracing an intuitive notion of
fairness, the impression I am left with is that of a body that was
fair, in that it was conspicuously rational and decorous. Translators were employed for the benefit of defendants, the accused were
given an opportunity to state their case and comment on the evidence against them, and Chinese law was considered for sentencing purposes.185 There is nothing to suggest that an attempt was
made to force confessions from the accused, or that the integrity of
the proceedings was affected by meddling from the military and
MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, supra note 70, at 58, 71–106.
Id. at 657–65.
181 Id. at 297.
182 See VICTOR NICOLAS, COMMENTAIRE COMPLET DU CODE DE JUSTICE MILITAIRE
POUR LES ARMÉES DE TERRE ET DE MER 87 (1898) (Art. 156, commentary) (stating that
the usual formalities of justice are to be complied with “only if there is time.”).
183 CODICE PENAL, supra note 71, at Art. 557.
184 See MILITÄRSTRAFGERICHTSORDNUNG, supra note 71, at Art. 304 (explaining
that as a general rule, witness testimony could not be replaced with interrogatories; see also Id. at Art. 293 (explaining that the accused, counsel, and/or the judges
may examine witnesses at trial).
185 See Annex 1, Second Session.
179
180
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political leadership in Peking. Nor is there any evidence that the
verdicts were preordained; when the foreign-appointed Prefect
and Subprefect scared up some purported Boxers for presentation
at the sixth session, the Commissioners declined to scapegoat the
three suspects they considered innocent.186 The Commissioners also forewent making a sentencing recommendation with respect to
suspected Boxer Chen-Che-Chiang, declining to try him in absentia.187 Sentencing followed the placement on the record and “careful investigation” of evidence that indicated support for the Boxer
cause or more direct involvement in Christian deaths.188 It is also
noteworthy that the Commissioners doled out sentences other than
capital punishment; the decision to demote Shen Chia Pen suggests
that verdicts were not predetermined, and that there was an effort
to make punishment proportional to crime, a fundamental principle of justice common to the legal traditions of all of the countries
from whence the Commissioners hailed.189
A core value of fairness is that those who participate as judges
remain free from bias and prejudgment. In this measure the correspondence of the British Commissioners presents a mixed picture.
Poole was a survivor of the fifty-five day siege on the international
legations of Peking. When the siege was lifted, he was tasked with
renewing his mission of learning Chinese, and in the course of recording in his diary the challenge this posed for him he made a
frank admission of enmity towards his antagonists: “I hate the
Chinese so.”190 This naturally raises some questions as to Poole’s
impartiality. But how much should be read into this singular remark? Poole was not one to editorialize, so its inclusion in his diary
testifies to the honesty behind the sentiment as well as his distressed state of mind. On the other hand, aside from a remark that
Chinese soldiers who attacked the legations were cowards, it is onSee Annex 1, Sixth Session.
See Annex 1, Seventh Session.
188 Lieutenant Turner, another American, also accompanied Hutcheson as an
aide-de-camp to General Gaselee. Although his report emphasizes the logistical
aspects of the operation, the author noted that he fully concurred in the version of
events described by Hutcheson, and mentioned in passing the punishments recommended by the “international court of inquiry” after “careful investigation.”
Soulard Turner, Report on March of Troops Composing Paotingfu Expedition, ARWD
1901, supra note 10, at 468 (Nov. 2, 1900). Turner’s report is also available in
NARA, RG 395/913.
189
See also Annex 1, Second Session (considering mitigating Quei Heng’s
sentence).
190 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, entry for Sept. 24, 1900.
186
187
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ly statement of its kind to appear in the diary. Nor, it should be
noted, was Poole particularly enamored with missionaries, who he
generally considered cowardly and lazy.191 Was Poole capable of
setting aside, or at least balancing out, his experiences in Peking
and judging the matter before him fairly? A letter to his mother
written while sitting as a Commissioner describes how the horrors
of the massacre “come out in the evidence,” implies as much, suggesting as it does that he actively listened to the case presented and
did not blindly convict.192
Communiques from Commissioner Jamieson in the days leading up to the trial suggest that he, at least, never succumbed to revengist sentiments. In fact, he maintained an admirable impartiality toward the accused, inclining neither toward a belief in Western
revenge as its own reward nor a presumption of guilt, at least with
respect to the fantai. His letter to MacDonald seeking the British
representative’s views on the punitive role of the Paoting-Fu expedition, drafted on the eve of the Commission’s first sitting, indicates a mind open to acquittal:
As soon as we [indecipherable] into a house (which I hope
will be tomorrow) I shall go into the whole questions and
be able to arrive at a conclusion as to his guilt or innocence. […]
Ting [Yung] has certainly been courageous enough to stay
here, has carried out his order to cause the Imperial troops
to disperse and rendered every assistance in procuring
supplies. To punish little fish who let themselves be caught
and leave unscathed the big ones who are beyond reach
would not seem equitable[,] however I trust you will favour
me with an expression of your opinion as to the political
expediency at the juncture of executing Ting [indecipherable] shot should he be found guilty. In any case he should be
cashiered and imprisoned in neglect of duty. He is a [indecipherable] influential clansman and that in itself could tend
to make him inclined to carry out Tuan’s orders.193
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 entries for July 11, 1900 and Aug. 8, 1900.
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, Letter ‘Outside the Walls of Poating-Fu’ (dated Oct. 25, 1900). Though it does leave open the possibility that he did not listen
with a critical ear.
193 NA, PRO 30/33/7/9 Jamieson to MacDonald, supra note 25 (emphasis added). Based on the structure and tone of the note, the suggestion that Ting Yung be
cashiered or imprisoned is best read as contingent on a finding of guilt.
191
192
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Not every decision the Commissioners made stands up to scrutiny. The proceedings are marred by (what are by modern standards) a number of clear deficiencies, lending them an indelible air
of impropriety, including the failure to clearly identify or provide
the accused with information concerning their charges, to explain a
legal basis for the charges, to provide defendants with counsel, to
clearly identify the substantive and procedural law to be applied,
to draft and publicize a proper verdict, and to insulate the proceedings from the decisive control of a Field-Marshall known for his anti-China bias. The reliance on public beheadings, as opposed to the
court proceedings themselves, to teach the desired moral lessons
reeks of condescension and implies that the Commissioners’ focus
was on results and not the process employed to reach them. Nevertheless, given the politically charged atmosphere, the abject brutality that had hitherto characterized the campaign in China, the
realities of the Allied command structure, and the logistical challenges that attended occupation of the provincial capital in a hostile foreign country, I am left with the firm impression that the trial
was conducted with a surprising degree of sensitivity to due process and the position of defendants. If the cloth from which the
Commission was stitched included patches of imperialism, bigotry
and revanchism, the tapestry that emerged looked on the whole far
fairer than what might have otherwise been expected. Though far
from the judicial ideal, the Commission skewed more in the direction of a good-faith stab at substantive justice than that of a star
chamber proceeding.
7. FINAL THOUGHTS
In a perfect world, the International Commission would have
heralded the arrival of a transformative moment for the international system. A ‘Paoting-Fu myth,’ much like a ‘Nuremberg
myth’ did nearly a century later,194 might have inspired a generation of jurists and statesmen to push for progressively more fair,
transparent, and legalistic Commissions that transcended their imperialist attachments, displaced the idea of uncompromising sovereignty, and achieved acceptance as a process by which all the cit194 PETER MAGUIRE, LAW
HISTORY viii (rev. ed. 2010).
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izens of the world, including the leaders of the Great Powers,
would be held to account for their crimes against humanity. The
Commission was a bomb headed toward the river of twentiethcentury legal and diplomatic practice. Had it exploded, the waters
may have been decisively redirected towards fields where norms
of international criminal law might have flourished. As a dud, its
percussive impact alone registered, barely detectable in post-war
memoires.
Has the field of international criminal law been ennobled by
the Commission’s recovery from obscurity? It certainly could be
framed that way. The inklings of some of the most laudable aspects of our contemporary international legal order—a striving to
penalize capricious butchery, to punish through judicial mechanisms organized according to reason, to emphasize the culpability
of individuals over that of groups, to distinguish between greater
and lesser wrongdoers, to incorporate the tools of law into the soldier’s and diplomat’s punitive arsenal, and to concretize a progressive legal and cultural ethos in a tangible institution—are discernable in the tale. As a legal matter, the Commission’s exercise of a
universal jurisdiction over state officials accused of supporting a
massacre acknowledged by the greater portions of the world’s
Powers to be an international crime was significantly ahead of its
time.
On the other hand, the Commission is stained by its qualified
reliance on the rationalized processes and forms of justice, as it
tended towards emotive expressions of vengeful retribution (public beheadings; endorsement of collective punishment in the form
of indemnity and property destruction) to teach its lessons, as well
as the failure of the Commissioners to display any awareness of the
relative novelty of their inquiry and tread with appropriate care,
for example, by producing a written verdict that developed a theory of liability that could be reviewed by the accused and the public,
or by adopting a maximalist view of the rights to which defendants
were entitled. The Commission is also inextricably associated with
an intervention in which the most ignoble and destructive impulses of the Allies were often given free reign, as well as the intellectual tradition of regarding the Chinese as second-class citizens that
countenanced this. Imperfect by any measure, the Commission is
an uncomfortable addition to the pantheon of international criminal courts. But acknowledging infelicities, however much they
may complicate today’s discussions of international criminal law’s
imperialist overtones or overreach, is a critical indicia of maturity
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and confidence. It is to be hoped then that the story of the Commission will be embraced as an attestation to how far we have
come, and a reminder that must always pursue justice with an eye
towards how history will judge us.
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8. ANNEX 1 (SESSION RECORDS)195
Paoting-Fu
International Investigative Commission to seek out, judge and
punish the principal authors of the massacres of Christians, and the
promoters of the same.
President. French General Bailloud
German Major von Brixen
English Captain Poole
Italian Major Agliardi (substituting Captain Ferrigo and
afterwards the Navy Lieutenant Di Sambuy)

Procès-verbal of the Sessions
The following notes were taken during the sessions of the commission and are not exhaustive, but include the procès-verbal of the
members, and are an integral part of the paperwork of the Investigatatory Commission that need to be presented to the FieldMarshall Von Waldersee.
Lieutenant Di Sambuy
Minutes of the 1st session (23-10-00)
Field-Marshall Waldersee
I have the honor of letting you know that the investigation
commission of which you did me the honor of being made presi195 Annex 1 is an English translation of ‘Commissione Internazionale
D’inchiesta Circa Il Massacro Di Cristiani’ found in the AUSSME, E-3, Rac 54, fol
40, (Federico Solchi trans.) I have reproduced as closely as possible this record’s
formatting in this Annex.
Fragments of these procès-verbal written in English and French are also found
in the diary of Commissioner Poole, held as ‘Microfilm diary of Capt (later Lt Col)
F G Poole, Middlesex Regiment, at Peking, China, 1900; associated with the 3rd
China War (Boxer Rebellion) (1900–1901)’ by the National Army Museum in London. I have included excerpts from the Poole Diary in footnotes where it clarifies,
expands, or deviates in a meaningful way from the more complete and officiallooking Italian document.
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dent, held today its first session.
All the designated members are present.
The commission considered all the information available about
the Boxer movement in Paoting-Fu, the harassment suffered by the
Christians and the massacres.
After a careful examination of all the documents this commission has decided to arrest all the people that were believed to be at
fault.
(Bailloud)
(etc etc)
This report is clearly incomplete, given that I was not present at the
time.
Lt. Di Sambuy
_______________________________
Minutes of the 2nd session (24-10-00)
The commission held its second session on October 24th at 9
a.m. All the designated members are present. The Fangtai (supreme treasurer) who was arrested the evening before is introduced and interrogated.
He is asked the following questions:
1- Why have you authorized the use of your seal on the
manifesto (of which we have here a copy) encouraging
the insurrectional movement of the Boxers?
2- Why have you encouraged the removal and condemned
the Mandarins that fought against the Boxers and tried
to protect the Christians, who were obedient to the order to the Viceroy?
3- Why haven’t you protected the Missionary Green and
his family, leaving them in the hands of the Boxers, who
could have killed them even if you did not give an explicit order to do so? 196
196 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you not protected Mr. Green [unreadable] and his family and communicated to the Boxers the desire to have them
massacred though not actually giving the order[?]”).
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4- Why when you heard from the Chinese Colonel WangShong-Kwei that the Europeans, American subject Mr.
Bagnall and his family were located in a village near
Paoting-Fu you did not do anything to assist them, becoming in this way an indirect accomplice of their
deaths?197
To all these questions the Fangtai gives evasive answers saying
that he was not aware of these facts or that he did not have enough
power to intervene or that he was only following orders coming
from his superiors.198
At the conclusion of these answers it seems to the Commission
not possible to keep the Fangtai in his role, and so the Commission
has the honor to present to Marshall Von Waldersee the removal of
the Fangtai from his position. The Fangtai is also kept in preventive detention since the Commission needs to understand his role
in the massacres.
_______________________________
After this appears in front of the Commission the Nie-Tai ShaiKuan.
The following questions were asked
1- Why did you order on the 28th day of the 8th moon the
billposting of an old edict of the Emperor that was hostile to Europeans and asked the Chinese of Christian religion to forswear their religion or to face death penalty?199
2- Were you advised by Father Dermont that the Christians in the village of Thien-Che Kuang were being attacked: why didn’t you do anything to protect them?
To the first question the Nietai answers that he does not remember about that particular decree.
On this matter an Italian missionary, Father Scipione asserted
197
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you done nothing when the
Colonel Wang told you the missionaries were there?”).
198 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“To all these questions, the Fengtai answered
in an evasive fashion, pleading ignorance and superior force against him and other orders, his inability to cope with matters.”).
199 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you posted the 28 th of the Eighth
moon an Imperial edict hostile to Europeans and ordering Chinese Christians to
abjure their religion under pain of death [unreadable] a statement hostile to Christians, and also afterwards a proclamation of the Emperor protecting the Christians?”).
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that he had a copy of this decree in Gausu and was sent there to
bring it to the Commission but at this stage he had not made his return, so the commission decides to postpone this part of the questioning to tomorrow in order to shed some light on this very important part of the proceedings.
To the second question the Nietai answers that he made all that
was in his power, but could not do more given that he was not the
Supreme Chief.200
Given these circumstances the Commission decides to keep the
Nietai under house arrest with continuous surveillance of the military authorities until tomorrow at 3 p.m. At that time the copy of
the decree will have come from Gausu and it will be easy to prove
his responsibility, culpability or innocence.
The third accused:
Wang-Shang-Kui
Colonel of the Chinese Cavalry acknowledges that he received in
his camp the Bagnall family. He sent the Bagnalls to Paoting-Fu
escorted by his soldiers who gave the family to other Chinese soldiers, who in the end gave the Bagnall family to the Boxers, who
killed them. He says that the papers he was given have been
burned but that he saved a note.201
The Commission in the meanwhile sends for some Chinese
who are believed to have witnessed the massacre. While waiting
for them to arrive the session is suspended.
_______________________________
Once the commission is again in session the witnesses have not
yet arrived and so the “Tartar Governor”, Commander of all the
Manchu troops, is introduced. He was arrested on October 22nd as
per order of the English General Gaselee.
The Governor has been indicated as being the supreme nominal head of the Boxers, having given them the support of his Prefect, given that his age and his deafness did not allow him for a direct action.
1st question: Why have you given full support to the Boxers?
200
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“To the second question the Nietai said he
wasn’t at the head of affairs.”).
201
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Their valuables, etc. were handed to him,
the papers had been burnt. A note has been made of the amount.”).
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1st answer: He answers that in reality he prohibited the Boxers to
go on with their meetings but they did not obey to his orders.
2nd question: Why haven’t you at least stopped your son and your
nephew who have been a very active part of the Boxers revolution?
2nd answer: He sustains that his son did not do anything.
The commission had already decided from the first session to
have his son arrested but unfortunately the son had been in Peking
for more than a month.
3rd question: Why, after the Fang-Tai closed the Boxers’ meeting
place, did you allow them to use your court in order for them to
meet?
3rd answer: He still denies that this is the truth, but the Fang-Tai
once more asked about this matter says that if these meetings were
not held in the neighborhood court, they were held in the houses of
the neighborhood of the tartar section. The culpability of the Tartar governor being verified, the Commission condemns him to the
death penalty. The advanced age of the Tartar governor would
have suggested mitigation to another punishment, but given that
there is not an alternative severe punishment available in this
country he is condemned to death, if the Marshall approves.202
_______________________________
Minutes of the 3rd session (25-10-00)
President is General Baillaud
All members present
All members agree in destroying the temple where the missionaries were tortured before being massacred on the 1st of July
and where Miss Norrell was walked naked and dragged by her
hair and feet. (The temple was indeed burned down on the 27 th day
of this month)
After this decision the testimony against:
Wang-Shang-Kui
The Colonel of the Chinese Cavalry is heard, the witnesses affirm that his own soldiers placed the Bagnall family into the hands
of the Boxers and also cut the head off of their little girl.
202 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Tartar Chief. Guilty, only his age in his favour. Unanimously agreed death, regrettable owing to his age.”).
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The witnesses affirm that Wang-Shang-Kui saw all this.203
Unanimously the Commission decides to condemn WangShang-Kui to death.204
_______________________________
Minutes of the 4th session (27-10-00)
President is General Bailloud
All members present
The Fangtai (Supreme Treasurer) appears and a telegram that
he sent to the Emperor is presented to him. The telegram reads, “I
do not have enough troops to kill the Christians, if a simple Christian villain or a simple solder would have come to rescue them, a
calamity would have happened.”205
The Commission unanimously proposed that the FangTai be
put to death.206
For the Nietai, the commission decides to proceed immediately
with his dismissal.
_______________________________
Minutes of the 5th session (29-10-00)
The Commission gets together in the house of the Fang Tai
(condemned to death) to select a few pieces of art to send as a present to Marshall Wandersee. Major Von Brisceu takes note of them
and is given the task of sending them to Marshal Waldersee.
_______________________________
Minutes of the 6th session (31-10-00)
The commission is reunited for its 6th session on Wednesday
October at 9 a.m. All the members are present and the presidency is given to General Bailloud.
31st

POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Witnesses against Wung Shang Kui said that
his soldiers had given the Bagnall family to the Boxers and had cut off the head of
the little girl, and had seen everything.”).
204 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Unanimously agreed guilty of death.”).
205
POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Fantai confronted with his dispatch to the
Emperor saying he had not sufficient troops to kill the Christians, and that if a
Christian bandit or a simple barbarian soldier came to save them it would be a
great calamity. [sic] He turned pale and made no answer.”).
206 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Unanimously agreed guilty of death.”).
203
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The (current) Prefect is introduced. He brings with him three
Shen-She (counselors) of the various neighborhoods of the city. He
also brings nine respectable businessmen and four prisoners who
were currently being held in Chinese prisons.
The Prefect has brought to the commission the Shen-She and
businessmen because they are well respected in town and could
help the commission in making a decision about the kind of justice
that needs to be done on this matter and the same is thought about
the businessmen.
All the Shen-She and the businessmen are interrogated by the
President in order to know what is their knowledge about the massacres and if they are aware of any Boxers name that need to be arrested and punished. All of them, naturally, respond almost in a
chorus that they are not aware of anything, that they have not seen
anything and that during the massacres they were in their business
or busy in other matters.
The president tells them that since they are notables in the city
they must be aware of what happened in their city, and that in
some way they are also indirectly responsible of the massacres.
The President adds that if they refuse the answer he will ask the
commission to condemn them with a fine.
All the witnesses continue their denials. They are then brought
outside.
After this four peasants are introduced by the Subprefect as
Boxers and presents to the Commission the accusation for each of
them.
Except for the first one whose name is Hu-Sang-Tien, who is a
very bad person and really indicated as a Boxer, all the other three
are just poor and dirty boys between 16 and 18 years of age that
were arrested by the Chinese forces because they were playing
[undecipherable] on the road at night.
The commission unanimously decides to retain only Hu-SangTien while the other three are remitted to the Prefect and the Subprefect so that they can ensure a punishment for them and this
punishment will need to be communicated to the Commission
once decided.
After a while the Prefect and the Subprefect come back to the
room stating that the Shen-She are not in any way useful to shed
light on the massacres or to find people that might be involved in
the massacres. The Commission decides to give them until next
Sunday November 4th, when the members of the commission will
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reunite for the last time, to give precise indications so to find other
guilty participants to the massacre.
During this session the Fangtai and the Nietai are also reintroduced before the commission in order to understand a bit more
about their role, but the first one is as possessed by the Devil and is
returned to prison while the second one says he does not know anything more than what he said and his powers were anyway limited, etc., for this reason also the Nietai is taken back to prison.
Von Brixen
Captain Poole
Signatures Lt. Sambuy
General Bailloud
_______________________________
Minutes of the 7th session (4-11-00)
General Bailloud is the President and all the members are present.
The Prefect and Subprefect are called in and are asked if they
have any news to give and if they have found any other Shen-She
(counselors) that need to be interrogated. The two answer that the
other Shen-She are not in Paoting-Fu but that they were told that
they needed to come to be interrogated.
The Commission decides to take down the names and the address of these Shen-She in order to act against them, in case it was
necessary, upon their return to Paoting-Fu, or in case they were arrested.
The Commission also decides that the military authority will
act against all the people that will be thought to be guilty of having
participated in the massacres against the Europeans and the Christians.
Chen–Che-Chiang, who was suspected of having taken an active role in the massacres, could not have been arrested since he
had since long time taken refuge in the mountains.
The commission, having terminated its work decides to terminate the sessions.
Given that the Shen-She are without doubt responsible, even if
only indirectly, for the disorders in Paoting-Fu, the commission
decides that a fine will be given to them. The amount of this fine is
decided to be 100,000 taels and the Prefect of Paoting-Fu is given
the order to ensure this is executed. The Prefect is given a month
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of time to acquire this sum and hand it over to the military commander at the headquarters of the second French brigade (this sum
will be given to the General Baillaud, since he is older than General
Von Kessler, who is the Commander of the German troops in Paoting-Fu).
The General Commander Bailloud will then give this sum to
His Excellency Marshall Von Waldersee, supreme commander of
the international troops. He will then redistribute this sum to the
European missionaries who had been affected during the revolution.
The Commission also decides that the execution of the death
penalty for the three people condemned will take place Tuesday 6 th
November 1900 at 10 a.m. at the very same place where the
protestant missionaries were massacred. At the same place will also occur the destitution of the Nietai after the execution of the
death penalties. The destruction of the pagodas located on top of
the city walls and the breach in the walls will also occur on the
same day at 8 a.m.

The commission will take part at the execution together with
troops located in Paoting-Fu.

Signatures
Paoting-Fu, 6 November 1900

Von Brixen
Captain Poole
Lt. Sambuy
General Bailloud

Execution of the punishments decided by the International Investigative Commission.
_______________________________
At 8 a.m. the explosion of 6 mines prepared by the German army causes the breach of the walls of the city of the dimension of
approximately 50 meters. This breach is located on the east part of
the walls and in the proximity of the South East corner. In the
meanwhile the four pagodas that were on top of the door of the
walls and the other four that were on the corners of the walls were
set on fire and were almost completely destroyed.
At 10 a.m. on the ground just outside the above mentioned
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breach and in proximity of the place of where the Boxers massacred the Europeans and in presence of the French and German
troops detached in Paoting-Fu, together with 4 Indian chevaliers
representing the English troops and 4 Italian Navy troops representing the Italian forces.
The French forces are being represented by circa 1000 men are
formed by navy infantry, a squadron of chivalry and a legion of
mountain artillery. The German forces, also being represented by
circa 1000 men, are formed by marine infantry and a battery of
country artillery.
General Baillaud, together with his Chiefs of staff and the
members of the investigative Commission take place in the middle
of the square and so does General Von Kettler with his Chiefs of
staff.
The troops pay their honors to their respective Commanders
and after that following the order of the President, are brought in
front of the people by German solders:
The Fangtai
The Tartar Governor
The Colonel of Cavalry
The Nietai
The first three are condemned to decapitation while the fourth
one is condemned to degradation and removed from office.
The executioner, once he obtained the authorization from the
President, proceeds in cutting off the heads of the first three. The
heads are then held up to be shown to those in attendance. The
Nietai is taken to prison.
The troops disperse and return to their headquarters
Signed Di Sambuy
Member for Italy of the Investigative Commission
Peking, November 1900.
Lieutenant Pietro Verri made a true and faithful copy of this
document.
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Figure 1 - The Graphic, March 9, 1901, at 4
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Figure 2 - Supplement to The Graphic, January 19, 1901, at 1
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Figure 3 - Le Petit Journal Supplement Illustre, January 20, 1901
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Figure 4 - Drawing of the execution by Commissioner Poole found in his
diary
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